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ADDRESSING BIG TECH’S MARKET
POWER: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Thomas A. Lambert*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a comparative institutional analysis of the three
leading approaches to addressing the market power of large digital platforms: (1) traditional antitrust law, the approach thus far taken in the
United States; (2) ex ante conduct rules, the approach embraced by the
European Union’s Digital Markets Act and several bills under consideration in the U.S. Congress; and (3) ongoing agency oversight, the approach
embraced by the United Kingdom with its newly established “Digital Markets Unit.” After identifying the general advantages and disadvantages of
each approach, the Article examines how they are likely to play out in the
context of digital platforms. It first examines whether antitrust is indeed too
slow and indeterminate to tackle market power concerns arising from digital platforms, as proponents of ex ante conduct rules and agency oversight
have suggested. It next considers possible error costs resulting from the
most prominent proposed conduct rules: (1) structural separations and line
of business restrictions; (2) bans on self-preferencing by platforms; (3) requirements to allow platform users to remove pre-installed software, “sideload” apps, and use alternative payment systems to make purchases on the
platform; and (4) data-portability, data-sharing, and platform interoperability mandates. It then shows how three features of the agency oversight
model—its broad focus, political susceptibility, and perpetual control—
render it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking efforts and agency capture.
The Article ultimately concludes that antitrust’s downsides (relative indeterminacy and slowness) are likely to be less significant than those of ex
ante conduct rules (large error costs resulting from high informational requirements) and ongoing agency oversight (rent-seeking and agency
capture).

* Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance and Professor of Law, University of Missouri Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F

OR a number of digital platforms, a perfect storm is brewing. Commentators and policymakers across the ideological spectrum and
the globe are increasingly calling for government efforts to rein in
the largest platforms—most notably those operated by the “GAFA”
firms: Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple.1 Politically progressive
voices maintain that the dominant technology firms hurt consumers, laborers, suppliers, and small businesses; contribute to wealth inequality by
earning monopoly profits for their disproportionately rich shareholders;
and have amassed excessive political power that undermines democracy.2
Conservatives share some of those concerns but emphasize most prominently that the firms have become gatekeepers of speech and informa1. Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, House Lawmakers Condemn Big Tech’s “Monopoly Power” and Urge Their Breakups, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/10/06/technology/congress-big-tech-monopoly-power.html [https://perma.cc/S5WPUQ5R].
2. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
16 (2018); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 739–40 (2017);
Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New
Standard for Antitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 595, 595 (2020).
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tion, and are biased against traditional moral values.3
In the United States, politicians as diverse as progressive U.S. Senator
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and her culturally conservative colleague Josh
Hawley (R-MO) have called for significant governmental restrictions on
the dominant technology platforms.4 The staff of a prominent congressional subcommittee,5 governmental officials outside the United States,6
and several prominent U.S. research centers have done so as well.7
Policymakers are heeding the call. In June 2021, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives advanced several bills that
would radically restructure the digital landscape,8 and the U.S. Senate
confirmed Lina Khan, an outspoken critic of several of the largest technology platforms, as a member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).9 After President Biden then elevated Khan to chair of the FTC,10
the Commission revoked its prior commitment to pursue only consumer
welfare in policing “unfair methods of competition,”11 paving the way for
3. See, e.g., JOSH HAWLEY, THE TYRANNY OF BIG TECH x–xi (2021).
4. See Lauren Hirsch, Elizabeth Warren’s Antitrust Bill Would Dramatically Enhance
Government Control Over the Biggest US Companies, CNBC (Dec. 7, 2019, 11:32 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/07/warrens-antitrust-bill-would-boost-government-controlover-biggest-companies.html [https://perma.cc/VC8Y-6GKE]; Bust Up Big Tech Act, S.
1204, 117th Cong. (2021) (sponsored by Senator Hawley).
5. See MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7–8 (2020).
6. See, e.g., DIGIT. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 4–6 (2019) (U.K. report on competition in digital platform markets); JACQUES
CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER, EUR. COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA: FINAL REPORT 3–4, 124–26 (2019); AUSTRALIAN
COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY 30–37 (2019).
7. See, e.g., STIGLER COMM. ON DIGIT. PLATFORMS, STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, FINAL REPORT 15–22 (2019) [hereinafter STIGLER CTR. REPORT]; BILL BAER, JONATHAN B. BAKER, MICHAEL KADES, FIONA SCOTT MORTON,
NANCY L. ROSE, CARL SHAPIRO & TIM WU, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, RESTORING COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2020).
8. See Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, Antitrust Overhaul Passes Its First Tests. Now,
the Hard Parts., N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/technology/antitrust-overhaul-congress.html [https://perma.cc/NN6L-DV6N]. The advanced bills
that would most alter the technology landscape were the Ending Platform Monopolies Act,
H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. (2021); the Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021,
H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021); the American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R.
3816, 117th Cong. (2021); and the Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling
Service Switching Act of 2021, H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. (2021). The Judiciary Committee
also advanced two related bills: the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021, H.R.
3843, 117th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 11, 2021) and the State
Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460, 117th Cong. (as reported by H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, May 21, 2021).
9. Cat Zakrzewski & Tyler Pager, Biden Taps Big Tech Critic Lina Khan to Chair the
Federal Trade Commission, WASH. POST (June 15, 2021, 6:50 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/06/15/khan-ftc-confirmation-vote [https://
perma.cc/7WKM-GTME].
10. See id.
11. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Rescinds 2015 Policy that Limited Its
Enforcement Ability Under the FTC Act (July 1, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2021/07/ftc-rescinds-2015-policy-limited-its-enforcement-ability-under
[https://perma.cc/LU8F-RNXP].
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rules forbidding practices deemed unfair to small businesses even if the
practices benefit consumers.12 Soon after the FTC’s policy reversal, President Biden issued an executive order encouraging the FTC to use its
now-expanded rulemaking power to rein in the major digital platforms.13
And in early 2022, members of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate voted on a bipartisan basis to advance two bills that would impose
digital platform restrictions similar to several of those mandated by the
previously advanced House bills.14
Many, though not all, of the social harms allegedly occasioned by the
major digital platforms stem from their purported market power—i.e.,
their ability to extract surplus by imposing contract terms (prices or nonprice terms governing matters like user privacy, data use, or terms of service) that they could not profitably impose if they faced the threat of
losing business to more accommodating rivals.15 Accordingly, most of the
proposals for restricting digital platforms aim somehow to reduce their
market power or to limit its exercise.16 That raises the question of how
best to constrain welfare-reducing exercises of market power by digital
platforms.
Historically, governments have used several different approaches to
limit welfare losses from market power.17 One approach is antitrust law: a
set of flexible, judicially crafted behavioral standards aimed at preventing
the creation or enhancement of market power by means other than competition on the merits.18 Another strategy is direct regulation: a set of ex
ante rules that forbid certain exercises of market power or foster market
12. See Bryan Koenig, Is the Consumer Welfare Standard on FTC’s Chopping Block?,
LAW360 (June 29, 2021, 8:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1398386 [https://
perma.cc/DLQ4-LS4B].
13. See Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,992 (July 9, 2021).
14. See Chris Mills Rodrigo & Rebecca Klar, Senate Panel Advances Bill Blocking
Tech Giants from Favoring Own Products, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2022, 3:15 PM), https://
thehill.com/policy/technology/590659-senate-panel-advances-bill-blocking-tech-giantsfrom-favoring-own-products [https://perma.cc/43WJ-6RRD] (discussing advancement of
American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2022)); Lauren Feiner,
Senate Committee Advances Bill Targeting Google and Apple’s App Store Profitability,
CNBC (Feb. 3, 2022, 11:46 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/03/senate-committee-advances-open-app-markets-act.html [https://perma.cc/WE5A-W2T7] (discussing advancement of Open App Markets Act, S. 2710, 117th Cong. (2022)).
15. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 5.01 (4th ed. 2017 & 2d ed. Supp. 2019) (defining market power). A number
of the concerns about the dominant technology platforms stem not from their market
power but from their sheer size. For example, the concern that technology firms endanger
democracy because they are so large that they have excessive political sway is not a concern about market power—i.e., the ability of a firm lacking competitive constraints to extract greater surplus by reducing market output. This Article’s focus is the alternative
means of addressing market power concerns, not other concerns related to size per se.
16. Ryan Tracy, Draft Antitrust Bills Would Restrict Online Platforms, WALL ST. J.
(June 9, 2021, 5:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/draft-antitrust-bills-would-restrict-online-platforms-11623269646 [https://perma.cc/S42X-YTU3].
17. See generally THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 145–75 (2017) (describing alternative remedies employed to address market
power).
18. Id. at 145–53. Antitrust does not forbid the creation, maintenance, or enhancement of market power by procompetitive means such as innovation or gains in productive
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competition.19 A third approach is to delegate to an expert agency the
power to enforce behavioral standards through continual oversight of
some set of firms that could attain and exercise market power.20 All three
approaches present both advantages and disadvantages, and each is more
appropriate in some circumstances than in others.
The purpose of this Article is to assess the relative merits of antitrust
law, direct regulation, and ongoing agency oversight as means of addressing market power concerns arising from large digital platforms. Eschewing the “Nirvana Fallacy” of inferring that a particular regulatory
approach is desirable because an idealized version would improve upon
the status quo, this Article embraces a “comparative institution” approach that attempts to assess the choice between real-world regulatory
options, warts and all.21
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II returns to first principles and
sets forth the approach policymakers should generally follow to select the
optimal means of addressing defects in private ordering. That approach
calls for policymakers to think like physicians by first cataloguing the
remedies available to address the defect under consideration and then
comparing the efficacy and side effects of each remedy.
Part III then provides a general description of the remedies traditionally used to address market power concerns—antitrust law, ex ante regulation, and continual agency oversight—and briefly identifies the typical
pros and cons of each. It observes that antitrust law can avoid the error
costs of one-size-fits-all rules and the political manipulation of agency
oversight, but may be indeterminate and slow; ex ante regulation is more
determinate and faster, but may entail high error costs because of the
efficiency. Nor does it forbid a firm that has gained market power legitimately from exercising that power by charging supracompetitive prices. As the Supreme Court observed,
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for
a short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not
be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(emphasis omitted).
19. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 160–75.
20. Id.
21. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents
the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real arrangements. In practice,
those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal
and the real and if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of
the comparative institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional
arrangement seems best able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal norm to provide standards from which divergences are assessed
for all practical alternatives of interest and select as efficient that alternative which seems
most likely to minimize the divergence.”).
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Hayekian knowledge problem; and agency oversight may be faster and
more determinate than antitrust law and less error-prone than ex ante
regulation, but is more susceptible to adverse public choice concerns.
Part IV digs deeper by examining how the efficacy limitations and general side effects of each of the remedies under consideration would manifest themselves in the context of digital platform regulation. It first
considers how antitrust law’s indeterminacy may be mitigated as pending
cases involving digital platforms are resolved and whether the purported
slowness of antitrust law has allowed adverse market power effects to
accumulate. Turning to ex ante regulation, Part IV assesses potential error
costs from proposed rules that would (1) mandate structural separations
and line of business restrictions;22 (2) ban digital platforms’ preferencing
of their own offerings; (3) require that platform users be allowed to remove pre-installed software, “side-load” digital applications (apps),23 and
use alternative payment systems to make purchases on the platform; and
(4) require data portability, data sharing, and interoperability. It then
considers how three features of the agency oversight model—its broad
focus, political susceptibility, and perpetual control—render it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking efforts and agency capture.
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING GOVERNMENTAL
FIXES FOR PRIVATE ORDERING DEFECTS
As sociologist Max Weber observed, the state possesses a right that is
denied all other social entities: the right to use force to achieve its objectives.24 Members of liberal societies have generally agreed that government should exercise its unique coercion right sparingly.25 To preserve
individual liberty, it should do so only to protect its citizens’ rights to
person or property and to address situations in which individuals’ management of their property to maximize their private benefits—private or22. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 379 (2020) (“Structural
separations prohibit a dominant intermediary from operating in markets that place the
intermediary in competition with the firms dependent on its infrastructure. Line of business restrictions, meanwhile, generally limit the markets in which a dominant firm can
engage.”).
23. “Side-loading” is installing third-party software on a platform—typically a mobile
operating system such as Apple’s iOS or Google’s Android—without using the platform’s
own app store. Adrian Croft, What Is Side-loading? Everything to Know About Tech’s
Latest Flashpoint, FORTUNE (July 14, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/07/14/whatis-side-loading-apple-ios-google-android [https://perma.cc/WHB8-3RE9].
24. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) (observing that government possesses a
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (emphasis
omitted)).
25. Andreas Anter, The Modern State and Its Monopoly on Violence, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MAX WEBER 230–31 (Edith Hanke, Lawrence Scaff & Sam Whimster eds.,
2020).
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dering—is likely to reduce overall social welfare.26 As Adam Smith
famously explained, individuals’ pursuit of private welfare (assuming they
do not violate others’ property rights) typically inures to the benefit of
society as a whole.27 But economists have identified a number of situations in which the pursuit of private gain can systematically reduce overall
social welfare even when formal property rights are respected.28 These
so-called market failures—e.g., externalities, public goods, information
asymmetry, and market power—may warrant the exercise of government’s unique coercion right.
A market failure, however, is never a sufficient condition for a governmental fix. Such interventions cannot be justified on efficiency grounds if
they would themselves create losses greater than those occasioned by the
market failures they are aimed at correcting. Efficiency-based policymaking therefore requires consideration of the ways in which government interventions may reduce welfare. Just as private ordering may
systematically fail to maximize social welfare in particular situations (i.e.,
when the conditions for market failure exist), various government interventions are systematically prone to produce losses under certain circumstances.29 Policymakers should always compare the expected costs of
market-failure-correcting government interventions to the expected benefits they would achieve in terms of market failure losses averted.
Moreover, it is not enough to assess a proposed intervention in isolation by asking whether the gains it would likely achieve exceed the losses
it would likely entail in terms of compliance costs and the value of beneficial transactions thwarted. Because the true cost of pursuing one available regulatory intervention includes the opportunity cost of foregoing
other available interventions,30 wise policymaking requires systematic
26. Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United
States v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 167, 168–70 (2005).
27. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776) (“As
every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the
support of domestick industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the
greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestick to
that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of
it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 25–26 (“It
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”).
28. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 160–70 (describing market failures and
examining alternative means of addressing them).
29. See generally id. (describing the typical failures of governmental interventions
aimed at averting various market failures).
30. Suppose, for example, that Policy A would create benefits of $70 million while
entailing compliance costs of $40 million and thwarting transactions worth $20 million.
Assessed in isolation, this intervention would appear cost-justified, securing a $10 million
net benefit. If, however, competing Policy B would create benefits of $50 million while
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comparison of the pros and cons of all available regulatory options (including the “no intervention” option). To facilitate such analysis, policymakers should proceed like physicians: after assessing the adverse
“symptoms” potentially justifying some sort of government intervention
and diagnosing the culprit “disease,” they should catalogue the range of
available “remedies,” consider the “side effects” of each, and select the
fix that offers the highest net benefit.31
III. MARKET POWER: SYMPTOMS, DISEASE, REMEDIES,
AND SIDE EFFECTS
A. THE SYMPTOMS

AND THE

UNDERLYING DISEASE

Market power is the ability of a firm that faces little competition to
enhance its profits by cutting back on its output, either quantitatively (reducing the number of units it produces so as to drive up the market-clearing price) or qualitatively (reducing the amount it spends on quality so as
to increase its per-unit profit margin).32 While firms earn higher profits
when they exercise market power, consumers experience harm in the
form of higher prices and/or reduced quality.33 In addition to redistributing surplus from consumers to producers, exercises of market power
occasion a “deadweight loss”—an overall reduction in social welfare—
because the productive activities the monopolist foregoes (i.e., making
more units or investing more in product quality) would generate benefits
in excess of their costs.34 Higher prices, reduced quality, and welfare-reducing misallocations of productive resources are thus the symptoms of
market power.
The disease giving rise to those symptoms is an absence of competition.35 In a competitive market, a single firm cannot cause market price to
rise by reducing its output because it controls an insufficient share of
overall market output to affect market price (i.e., it is a “price-taker”
rather than a “price-maker”) and other producers would expand output
in response to a price increase, causing prices to return to competitive
entailing compliance costs of $20 million and thwarting transactions worth $5 million, Policy A would not be cost-justified: Foregoing the $25 million in net benefits available from
competing Policy B would be an additional cost (an opportunity cost) of pursuing Policy A,
so the net benefits available from the latter policy would be –$15 million. By contrast,
when the opportunity cost of not pursuing Policy A (lost benefit of $10 million) is added to
Policy B’s cost, Policy B remains cost-justified, providing a net benefit of $15 million.
31. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 14–15.
32. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at § 5.01 (“Market power is the ability to
raise price profitably by restricting output.”). Market power may also exist on the buyer
side of the market, referred to as monopsony power, where a buyer exerting monopsony
power may profitably withhold demand to drive down price and thereby enhance its profits. See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY E. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1993). For ease of exposition, we focus here on monopoly (sellerside) power, but both forms of market power reduce social welfare.
33. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1041
(2000).
34. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 142–44.
35. Id. at 145.
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levels.36 Moreover, any firm that skimps on quality in a competitive market will lose sales to its rivals.37 Cutbacks on quantity or quality may enhance the seller’s profits, though, when the market includes only one
significant seller (monopoly) or when nominal rivals agree not to compete with each other (collusion).38
Numerous digital markets currently feature a dominant provider—e.g.,
Google for internet search, YouTube for hosting user-generated videos,
Amazon for online retailing, Google’s suite of advertising technology services for buying and selling digital advertisements, Facebook for social
networking, and Apple’s and Google’s proprietary app stores for their
respective mobile operating systems (iOS and Android). Many voices
maintain that the absence of competition in these markets has resulted in
predictable market-power harms: higher prices and reduced quality. Currently pending lawsuits, for example, allege that monopoly has produced
supracompetitive prices for mobile-app distribution39 and digital-advertising services.40 With respect to reduced quality (a more common complaint in digital platform markets given that the services provided are
often free to users), alleged monopoly harms include: less consumer privacy in social networking, search, and web browsing;41 more onerous
speech restrictions on platforms that host user-generated content;42 less
favorable “offering placement” for firms operating on platforms (e.g.,
sellers on Amazon and publishers that allow their content to be indexed
36. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 55–58 (4th ed. 1999) (describing a perfectly competitive
market).
37. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 159.
38. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, at 55–58.
39. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1–5, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2021
WL 4128925 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) (No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR) [hereinafter Epic v. Apple Complaint]; Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2–8, Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC,
No. 3:20-cv-05671-NC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Epic v. Google Complaint]. In
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., the district court recently entered judgment in favor of
defendant Apple on plaintiff Epic’s claims under § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act and California’s Cartwright Act, but it granted judgment in favor of Epic on one claim brought
under California’s Unfair Competition Law. See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20cv-05640-YGR, 2021 WL 4128925, at *1, *107–20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021). Both Epic and
Apple have appealed the judgments against them. See Notice of Appeal at 2, Epic Games,
Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2021 WL 4128925 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2021) (No. 4:20-CV-05640-YGRTSH); Notice of Cross Appeal at 2, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2021 WL 4128925
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2021) (No. 4:20-CV-05640-YGR-TSH).
40. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 168, 171, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter U.S. v. Google Complaint]; First Amended Complaint
for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 224–28, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03590-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021) [hereinafter FTC v. Facebook Amended Complaint];
Complaint ¶¶ 2, 268–70, Texas v. Google LLC, No. 4:20-cv-00957 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020)
[hereinafter Texas v. Google Complaint]; Complaint ¶¶ 8–16, Colorado v. Google LLC,
No. 1:20-cv-03715-APM (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Colorado v. Google
Complaint].
41. See, e.g., U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 167, 171; FTC v. Facebook
Amended Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 224–28. See generally Nathan Newman, The Costs
of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 850–52 (2014).
42. STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 274.

82

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

on Google Search);43 reduced innovation by third-party creators who will
invest less in developing new offerings if they can be relegated to less
prominent positions on essential platforms;44 and lower quality platforms,
as platform operators deliberately deny product-enhancing features such
as interoperability and data portability in order to preclude competition
and protect their market power.45 With all these purported harms, the
alleged culprit is the absence of competition facing the dominant firm.
B. AVAILABLE MARKET POWER REMEDIES AND THEIR EFFICACY
LIMITATIONS AND SIDE EFFECTS
1. Three Remedies
Traditionally, governments have employed three means to address
market power concerns. The most widely used approach is antitrust law—
a set of judicially crafted behavioral standards aimed at remedying the
two situations in which market competition breaks down: collusion and
monopoly.46 In the United States, the genesis of these judicial standards
was the Sherman Act of 1890.47 Section 1 of the Sherman Act addresses
collusion by proclaiming that “[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to
be illegal.”48 Section 2 addresses monopolies by making it a felony to
monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize a market.49
Because these statutory prohibitions are quite bare-boned (and literally nonsensical, as a ban on contracts in restraint of trade would outlaw
most private contracts),50 federal courts quickly put interpretive glosses
on them. Today, § 1 is taken to forbid agreements that “unreasonably”
restrain trade,51 and § 2 precludes unreasonably exclusionary conduct
43. Id. at 61–64; U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 170.
44. STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 74–78; U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra
note 40, ¶¶ 166, 170.
45. See U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 170. See generally Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1069
(2017); THOMAS M. LENARD, TECH. POL’Y INST., IF DATA PORTABILITY IS THE SOLUTION,
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 3–5 (2020), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/01/Lenard_If-Data-Portability.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBS2-EN3Q].
46. See generally, LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 145–47.
47. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
48. Id. § 1.
49. Id. § 2.
50. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the
term “restraint of trade” in § 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition because “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains” and because “[t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence”).
51. Id. (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition.”).
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that could create market power.52 In all cases, the reasonableness of a
challenged act turns on its probable effect on market output: if the act is
likely to enhance market output for the benefit of consumers, it is reasonable; if output reduction and consumer harm are likely, the act is unreasonable and thus illegal.53
As courts have gained experience with particular business practices,
they have calibrated the showings required to establish antitrust liability.
Some particularly pernicious practices are conclusively presumed unreasonable (i.e., are per se illegal);54 others are effectively subject to a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness (i.e., are subject to “quick-look”
review);55 and most are presumed reasonable unless the plaintiff can establish certain facts suggesting that the practice is likely to reduce market
output (i.e., are assessed under the full-blown rule of reason).56 As economic learning expands and business practices evolve, courts alter the
conduct-specific showings required to establish liability or a defense
thereto.57
Antitrust law does not—with very few exceptions—attempt to specify
ex ante exactly what a firm is allowed or forbidden to do.58 Opting instead
52. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The “Exclusion of a Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2014).
53. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2–5, 8 (2005) (describing an output-focused understanding of competition).
54. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use.”).
55. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (observing that quick-look
analysis is appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets”); id. at 775 n.12 (observing that quick-look analysis effectively requires “shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects”).
56. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed under a ‘rule of reason,’ according to which the finder of fact must decide whether
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature,
and effect.” (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982))); Ohio
v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (observing that “the plaintiff has the
initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect
that harms consumers in the relevant market” under the rule of reason). See generally
Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 80, 83 (2018); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 39–42
(2017).
57. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87,
898–99 (2007) (abrogating per se rule in light of subsequent economic learning); id. at
898–99 (directing courts to craft structured, practice-specific rule of reason based on learning and experience).
58. The exceptions are antitrust’s rules of per se illegality for practices, such as naked
horizontal price-fixing, that experience has shown are always or almost always anticompetitive. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2283 (“A small group of restraints are unreasonable
per se because they ‘always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output.’” (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988))).
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to evaluate, ex post, a firm’s compliance with a general directive to avoid
restraining market output, antitrust law is “standards-based.”59 The specific contours of its standards are fleshed out by politically insulated
courts.60 Antitrust law is also a “therapeutic” market power remedy,
meaning that it seeks to cure the disease causing adverse market effects—
a lack of competition—and does not merely treat the symptoms of softened competition (e.g., increased prices and reduced quality) as a “palliative” remedy.61
A second way to address market power concerns is through the imposition of conduct rules that specify ex ante precisely what conduct is forbidden or permitted. The rules may seek to force the outcome that would
result if the market were competitive, as when natural monopoly utilities
are required to charge rates resembling those that would prevail under
competitive conditions.62 Such rules are a palliative remedy for market
power in that they seek to alleviate market power symptoms (e.g.,
supracompetitive prices) without curing the underlying disease (the lack
of competition). Other sorts of conduct rules may mandate behaviors designed to foster competition, as when telephone networks are required to
provide potential rivals with access to their facilities.63 Such rules are
therapeutic in nature.
Because they are more rigid and prescriptive than antitrust law’s flexible standards, and thus less likely to be appropriate for a broad range of
diverse firms, ex ante rules addressing market power concerns tend to be
59. Whereas a rule specifies before the actor acts exactly what behaviors are forbidden
and permitted, a standard posits a somewhat amorphous behavioral directive and then
assesses an act’s compliance after the act has occurred. For example, a posted speed limit is
a rule, while tort law’s directive to use reasonable care (i.e., to avoid negligence) is a standard. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 101.
60. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952,
2006–07 (2021).
61. Id.
62. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 153–58. Natural monopolies exist when
the economies of scale in an industry continue for so long that minimum efficient scale—
the point at which scale economies are exhausted—occurs beyond the output level that
would satisfy competitive market demand. In such a market, having multiple producers
and dividing market demand among them would result in each firm’s producing at a less
efficient scale than if a single firm supplied the whole market. To minimize production
costs, a single firm should supply the market, so the law should not encourage entry as
antitrust law does. The single producer, though, will be a monopolist and, left to its own
devices, would charge monopoly prices. Given this dilemma—the need for a single seller to
maximize productive efficiency but a likelihood that such a seller would charge allocatively
inefficient monopoly prices—policymakers have typically displaced antitrust law in natural
monopoly markets with a direct regulatory regime that protects the producer’s monopoly
status but mandates that the producer not charge monopoly prices. Prices are usually
capped at a level that allows the recovery of the producer’s costs, including its costs of
capital. Natural monopolies may also exist when the market-satisfying output level occurs
beyond the point of minimum efficient scale, but adding a second producer and splitting
production among them would drive production costs above the level that would prevail
with a single producer. See id.; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M.
VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 401–08 (4th ed. 2005).
63. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (imposing interconnection requirements on incumbent local exchange carriers).
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limited in scope.64 They are usually tailored for a particular industry or
group of firms.65 By contrast, antitrust law’s standards are focused on
ends rather than specific means, are therefore less likely to “misfire”
when applied broadly,66 and are thus assumed to govern a firm’s behavior
in the absence of direct regulation addressing competitive concerns. Antitrust law can be said to be the “residual regulator” of market power—the
body of law that governs unless it is displaced by more tailored competition rules.67
A third approach to addressing market power concerns would retain
the standards-based approach of antitrust law but delegate the task of
fleshing out and implementing the relevant standards not to generalist
courts resolving discrete disputes but to expert agencies exercising continued oversight of the firms subject to the standards.68 The expert agency
could issue, and update as needed, specific orders and rules to ensure
compliance with the standard.
This model resembles the approach taken by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which issues broadcast licenses on the condition that the licensee serve the “public interest, convenience, and
necessity” and promulgates orders and rules to achieve that end.69 A
traditional justification for the FCC’s broad authority to interfere with
broadcasters’ business decisions—including speech-restricting decisions
about what programming to feature—was the power conferred by a
broadcast license given the scarcity of the airwaves.70 Because a licensee
would face little competition, the FCC was authorized to oversee licensees’ decision-making—even decisions concerning speech—in the hopes
of producing the sort of market outcomes (programming variety, diverse
viewpoints, etc.) that would prevail in a competitive market.71
Across the globe, all three approaches—antitrust law, ex ante regulation, and continual agency oversight—have been used or proposed as
means of addressing market power concerns arising from dominant digital platforms. In the United States, each of the GAFA firms is currently
64. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 100–01.
65. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom
and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1863–64 (discussing
ongoing agency supervision in the telecommunications market).
66. See Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 2021.
67. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 335, 341 (2004) (“One consequence of regulation is a reduced role for the
antitrust laws. When the government makes rules about price or output, market forces no
longer govern. To that extent antitrust is shoved aside. A corollary is that as an industry
undergoes deregulation, or removal from the regulatory process, antitrust re-enters as the
residual regulator.”).
68. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 65, at 1863–64.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
70. See Audrey Perry, Scarcity Rationale, FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009),
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1016/scarcity-rationale [https://perma.cc/AR9A3KMJ].
71. See JOHN W. BERRESFORD, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE SCARCITY RATIONALE
FOR REGULATING TRADITIONAL BROADCASTING: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED 1–3
(2005).
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defending major antitrust lawsuits.72 In Europe, the European Commission proposed a Digital Markets Act73 that would impose a set of common ex ante rules on large digital platforms deemed to be economic
“gatekeepers,” a group that would include each GAFA firm (while notably excluding the largest European-based technology platform, Spotify).74 Several of the bills recently advanced by the Judiciary Committees
of the U.S. House and Senate would impose a similar regime in the
United States.75 In the United Kingdom, policymakers have recently
launched a Digital Markets Unit that will provide continual agency oversight and tailored, platform-specific rules for large digital platforms.76
2. Efficacy Limitations and Side Effects
Like alternative medical treatments for a physical disease, the different
approaches to addressing market failures vary in their efficacy and pro72. Google has been sued by the Justice Department for monopolizing internet search,
see U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, and by two coalitions of states for monopolizing certain ad tech markets, see Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 40; Colorado v.
Google Complaint, supra note 40. Amazon has been sued over contracts with publishers
that preclude them from offering lower prices on competing retail platforms. See Class
Action Complaint ¶ 8, Cook. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-01369 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2021) [hereinafter Cook v. Amazon Complaint]. The company is also under investigation
by E.U. antitrust officials for using data about third-party vendors’ sales in crafting its own
private label offerings and for preferencing its own offerings and those of third-party vendors that choose to use its logistics and fulfillment services. See European Commission
Press Release IP/20/2077, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the Use of Non-Public Independent Seller Data and Opens Second Investigation
into Its E-Commerce Business Practices (Nov. 10, 2020). Facebook is defending a lawsuit
by the FTC for monopolizing the market for general social networking. See FTC v.
Facebook Amended Complaint, supra note 40. Apple has been the subject of legal challenges by both Spotify in Europe, see European Commission Press Release, IP/20/1073,
Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigations into Apple’s App Store Rules (June 16, 2020),
and Epic Games in the United States, see Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, over its
allegedly exclusionary app store policies.
73. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), at 1–3, COM
(2020) 842 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
74. See Dirk Auer, The Flaws in Europe’s Digital Markets Regulation, EURACTIV
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/all/opinion/the-flaws-in-europes-digitalmarkets-regulation [https://perma.cc/Z7Q3-39XA] (“[R]evenue thresholds outlined in the
DMA seem designed purposefully to exclude European platforms, notably Spotify.”).
75. See Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2021) (mandating structural separations/line of business restrictions for large digital platforms); Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Services Switching Act of 2021, H.R.
3849, 117th Cong. §§ 2(a)–(b) (2021) (mandating data portability and platform interoperability); American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021) (precluding covered platforms from discriminating among offerings, preferencing their own
offerings, or restricting software uninstallation, data porting by business users, side-loading
of apps, or certain communications between business users and their customers); American
Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2022) (restricting self-preferencing, discrimination among offerings, and limits on software uninstallation); Open App
Markets Act, S. 2710, 117th Cong. (2022) (precluding limitations on side-loading and the
use of third-party payment systems for in-app purchases).
76. Parmy Olson, U.K. Launches New Competition Watchdog Targeting Big Tech,
WALL ST. J. (April 6, 2021, 7:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-k-launches-new-competition-watchdog-targeting-big-tech-11617750061?mod=pls_whats_news_us_business_f
[https://perma.cc/UKV4-Y7PR].
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duce different side effects.77 The primary limitation of antitrust law as a
market-power remedy is an efficacy concern: it can be indeterminate and
slow.78 Antitrust law can be indeterminate because it forbids only “unreasonable” instances of certain business behaviors (trade-restraining agreements and exclusionary acts) and typically assesses reasonableness on a
case-by-case basis according to a practice’s effect on overall market output.79 Antitrust can be slow because it is enforced through court orders
that require time-consuming lawsuits.80
It is important, however, not to overstate these limitations. As precedents develop, antitrust becomes both more determinate (as business
planners, enforcers, and courts may look to past judgments to predict
how courts will assess the reasonableness of a challenged practice) and
faster (as the growing pattern of precedents deters conduct likely to generate an adverse judgment). In the early days of new business models and
market structures, legal expectations are unclear, and adjudication is required to establish them. Antitrust law’s directives become clearer and
generate more immediate effects as precedents develop around novel
markets and practices.
Relative to antitrust law, ex ante regulation is more determinate and
may achieve its goals more quickly. For example, regulators may posit
immediately effective, bright-line rules that preclude dominant firms
from exercising their market power or that facilitate market entry.81 But
ex ante regulation threatens a significant side effect that is less of a concern with flexible antitrust standards: error costs resulting from high informational requirements.82
In setting forth prospective conduct rules, regulators engage in a form
of centralized economic planning by dictating how productive resources
are—and are not—allocated.83 If the rules imposed unwittingly misallocate resources away from their highest and best ends, social welfare will
be reduced.84 And as rules become less flexible, increasingly prescriptive
(i.e., dictating more precise arrangements), and more generally applicable, the information required for assuring that they do not “misfire”
grows.85 As F.A. Hayek observed, centralized economic planning entails
“the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.”86 An authority seeking to enhance social welfare by imposing a gen77. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 145–53 (cataloguing alternative remedies
for classic market failures—e.g., externalities, public goods, information asymmetry, market power—and assessing their efficacy limitations and side effects).
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 151.
80. Robert E. Litan, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 429, 431
(2001).
81. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 178–79.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 31–32.
84. Id. at 178–83.
85. See id. at 178–79.
86. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 (1945).
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erally applicable prohibition must know, for example, which instances of
future behavior its ban would preclude; the value the forbidden behaviors
would have created given citizens’ subjective preferences (to which only
they are privy); and the amount of welfare loss the prohibition is likely to
avert—a matter that also turns on people’s private preferences.87 Similar
informational requirements apply when regulators seek to enhance welfare through imposition of a generally applicable mandate—a “thou
shalt,” as opposed to a “thou shalt not.”88
Like antitrust law, the third approach to addressing market-power concerns—ongoing agency oversight—involves flexible standards whose precise requirements are determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the
totality of the circumstances.89 The approach thus entails fewer of the
Hayekian “knowledge problem” concerns that bedevil ex ante conduct
rules.90 But by delegating the authority to determine specific requirements to a politically constituted expert agency rather than to apolitical,
generalist courts, the approach threatens losses from what we may term
“public choice concerns.”91
The branch of economics known as public choice applies economic
analysis to political decision-making.92 Eschewing the romantic vision of
politics in which political actors set aside their personal preferences to
pursue some version of the public good, public choice assumes that people act in the political arena as they do in non-political realms: as rational
self-interest maximizers.93 Thus, citizens “vote their pocketbooks”; politicians pursue election and reelection; unelected bureaucrats seek to enhance their job prestige, their salaries, the resources at their disposal, and
their future earnings prospects; and members of interest groups seek to
maximize their private returns.94 Two key insights of public choice are
that private actors will often seek to coopt government’s unique coercion
right in order to increase their private returns—a process called “rentseeking”95—and that government entities with significant discretionary
authority will frequently acquiesce to those private actors’ demands as
the authorities become “captured” by private concerns.96 The potential
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 31–32.
See id.
Id. at 161–65.
See Hayek, supra note 86, at 520.
Id. at 168–69.
Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1041 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987).
93. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II 11 (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984).
94. See generally William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 428–30 ( David R. Henderson ed., 2008).
95. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224, 231–32 (1967) (providing an example of rent seeking); Anne O. Krueger, The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291 (1974).
96. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (observing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” in regulated industries).
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for welfare losses resulting from (1) the squandering of resources on nonproductive rent-seeking activity and (2) the loss of market competition as
rent-seekers co-opt government’s power to hobble their rivals constitute
public-choice concerns.97 Experience has shown that both rent-seeking
and agency capture are especially likely when politically constituted expert agencies have substantial discretionary authority over firms with
which they have continual contact.98
In the end, each of the available remedies for market power entails
pros and cons. Antitrust law avoids many knowledge problems and public-choice concerns, but it is less determinate and operates more slowly, at
least when business models are new.99 Ex ante conduct rules are determinate and take effect quickly, but they entail a substantial knowledge
problem.100 The agency oversight approach may be quicker and more determinate than antitrust and may raise fewer knowledge-problem concerns than do ex ante rules,101 but the approach raises significant publicchoice concerns.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED REMEDIES IN THE
CONTEXT OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS
Having catalogued the remedies available for addressing market power
and identified the typical efficacy limitations and side effects of each, we
turn to consider how the remedies would fare in addressing market power
concerns arising from dominant digital platforms. We focus primarily on
the chief limitation(s) of each proposed remedy.
A. ANTITRUST LAW
As explained, the primary limitations of antitrust law as a remedy for
market power are that it is somewhat indeterminate and proceeds slowly,
as it requires often-complicated lawsuits to establish and enforce specific
conduct standards. As Mike Walker, chief economist of the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority, recently testified before the
U.S. Congress, “[t]here are two main problems with relying on [antitrust
law]” in markets involving digital platforms: “It is too slow,” and “[i]t is
primarily backward looking [so that] you run the risk of playing wack97. See Thomas A. Lambert, Rent-Seeking and Public Choice in Digital Markets, in
GLOBAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 498, 503–04 (2020).
98. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 168–69.
99. Even antitrust courts may face a knowledge problem in crafting remedies, particularly conduct remedies that prescribe or forbid particular behaviors and entail a measure of
central planning. See id. at 152–53 (describing error costs in antitrust adjudication). Antitrust actions may also be means of rent-seeking by private concerns. See Lambert, supra
note 97, at 519–30 (arguing that lawsuits challenging app store policies of Apple and
Google are rent-seeking endeavors).
100. Ex ante conduct rules may also entail public choice concerns, given that the legislatures and regulatory bodies that impose them are subject to political manipulation by private interests.
101. Agencies with continual oversight authority may still face a knowledge problem
when promulgating widely applicable prospective rules.
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amole.”102 The essence of this latter criticism is that antitrust does not
provide prospective guidance—i.e., that it is indeterminate. It is doubtful,
however, that these concerns are as grave as Walker and other proponents of non-antitrust market power remedies suggest.
With respect to indeterminacy, a number of cases are currently pending
that will soon increase the clarity of antitrust’s directives in the digital
platform space. At the time of this writing, Google is defending government lawsuits challenging (1) its efforts to secure default status for its
search engine on various “search access points”103 and (2) a number of its
purportedly exclusionary actions taken in markets for digital advertising
services (ad tech).104 Facebook is facing claims challenging its acquisitions
of firms that could have emerged as competitors (Instagram and WhatsApp) and its refusal to grant developers of apps access to its platform
unless they agreed neither to compete with it nor to work with its competitors.105 Amazon is facing challenges to its use of “most favored nations” clauses that allegedly reduce price competition106 and to its use of
data on third-party sales to inform its own product decisions.107 Apple is
defending challenges to its refusal to permit side-loading of third-party
apps (i.e., installation outside its proprietary App Store);108 its requirement that purchases made while using apps running on its mobile operating system, iOS, utilize its proprietary In-App Purchase payment
system;109 and its refusal to allow iOS apps to evade revenue sharing by
directing users outside the apps to make purchases.110 Google is defending similar challenges to actions that purportedly discourage side-loading—unlike Apple, Google technically permits the practice—and to its
insistence that in-app purchases be made using its proprietary payment
system.111
The resolution of these lawsuits, which are just some of the pending
antitrust actions against digital platforms, will provide guidance on a
number of open issues, including (1) the propriety of digital defaults and
the appropriate means of securing default status, (2) the acquisition of
nascent or potential competitors, (3) the propriety of most favored nations clauses involving digital retailers, (4) limits on the use of “closed”
platform ecosystems, (5) limits on the use of data derived from one digital
102. Reviving Competition, Part 3: Strengthening the Laws to Address Monopoly Power:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. & Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 117th Cong. 1–2 (2021) [hereinafter Reviving Competition Hearing] (testimony
of Dr. Mike Walker, Chief Economic Advisor, U.K. Competition and Markets Authority).
103. See U.S. v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 2–4.
104. See Texas v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶ 262; Colorado v. Google Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 8–16.
105. See FTC v. Facebook Amended Complaint, supra note 40, ¶¶ 225–27.
106. Cook v. Amazon Complaint, supra note 72, ¶¶ 23–25.
107. European Commission Press Release, IP/20/2077, supra note 72.
108. See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 7–13.
109. Id. ¶ 10.
110. European Commission Press Release, IP/20/1073, supra note 72.
111. See Epic v. Google Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 21–24; Complaint ¶¶ 3–5, Utah v.
Google, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-05227 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021).

2022]

Addressing Big Tech’s Market Power

91

offering to inform or enhance another, and (6) a platform operator’s permissible means of extracting surplus from platform users. Displacing antitrust on grounds of its indeterminacy seems improvident when antitrust
precedents in the area of digital platforms are soon to accumulate.112
But what about antitrust’s purported slowness? The implicit assumption here is that the protracted nature of antitrust enforcement and adjudication has allowed social welfare losses from market power to
proliferate in digital markets.113 The soundness of that assumption, however, is questionable.
To be sure, digital platforms have grown quite large over the past two
decades.114 But size alone does not generate adverse market power effects—i.e., higher prices, lower quality, and deadweight loss from failure
to engage in welfare-enhancing production. In industries featuring significant economies of scale and network effects, larger firms will be able to
offer a better deal for consumers and will thus succeed relative to their
smaller rivals.115 In such industries, using state power to “force smallness” will cause a reduction in overall market output—the ultimate symptom of market power and the harm antitrust is designed to avert.116
Moreover, in markets in which one firm is likely to dominate because of
economies of scale and network effects, firms, even dominant ones, often
compete “for the market” by continually enhancing output both quantitatively and qualitatively.117 The mere fact that digital platforms have
grown large, then, does not by itself suggest that antitrust is not
working.118
112. This point echoes FTC Commissioner Christine Wilson’s recent call for Congress
to await resolution of the major pending antitrust lawsuits against digital platforms before
making sweeping changes to the U.S. antitrust laws. See Alex Wilts, Wilson: Resolve Big
Tech Cases Before Reforming Antitrust Laws, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (April 12, 2021),
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/gcr-usa/digital-markets/wilson-resolve-big-tech-casesreforming-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/H7KK-VY88].
113. Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1958–60.
114. Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (April 30,
2020), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/W5XC-CMFG].
115. Economies of scale exist when producers’ long-run average cost could drop by
expanding productive capacity. In industries in which firms face high fixed costs, the output
range in which economies of scale exist may be great. See generally LAMBERT, supra note
17, at 153–56. For production within that range, firms that have greater productive capacity
can achieve lower per-unit costs and can thus charge lower prices sustainably. See id. Network effects exist where a firm’s offering is more attractive as it serves more customers, as
with an internet messaging service or social media platform. See Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 93, 94 (1994) (observing that network effects exist when “the value of membership to one user is positively
affected when another user joins and enlarges the network”). Both economies of scale and
network effects reward scale and thus encourage larger firms with greater market shares.
116. See generally LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 153–56.
117. See generally P.A. Geroski, Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets, 3
J. INDUS., COMPETITION & TRADE 151, 152–53 (2003) (describing competition “for” the
market).
118. For a period in the mid-twentieth century, antitrust law did look beyond market
output effects to police bigness per se, and a number of contemporary commentators—socalled Neo-Brandeisians—favor a return to that “big is bad” approach. See, e.g., WU, supra
note 2, at 16–17; Khan, supra note 2, at 716; HAWLEY, supra note 3. I have elsewhere
explained why such a policy transition would be misguided. See Thomas A. Lambert, The
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The key question is whether we are witnessing an epidemic of actual
market power symptoms in markets involving digital platforms. It is far
from clear that we are. Many of the most prominent services provided by
the dominant digital platforms (e.g., search services, social networking,
email, digital photo storage) are free, or at least offered at zero monetary
cost, to one set of users, who obviously experience no adverse price effects.119 Of course, the services a platform provides for free to one set of
consumers are often financed by payments from someone else, most
often advertisers. But there is little evidence that advertising prices are
rising. Indeed, overall advertising spending as a percentage of GDP has
fallen since the advent of the major digital platforms,120 and prices for
digital advertising have dropped steadily.121
When it comes to product and service quality, digital platform markets
appear to be performing remarkably well. The GAFA firms are hardly fat
monopolists enjoying the quiet life that results from a lack of competition. They are better characterized as relentless innovators that continually improve their offerings for the benefit of consumers.122 Even on the
matter of user privacy, the quality aspect most often alleged to be deficient as a result of platforms’ market power, consumers increasingly have
options that satisfy their preferences. In search, DuckDuckGo, Startpage,
Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1097, 1109–18 (2020). For extended treatment of that matter, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
119. See STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 54–56. The challenges to Apple’s and
Google’s app store policies do allege that consumers are being forced to pay excessive
prices (albeit indirectly). See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 5; Epic v. Google
Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 5. But those challenges hardly show that antitrust adjudication
is intolerably slow. Epic Games filed its actions on August 13, 2020, Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39; the three-week Apple trial was completed by May 24, 2021, Minute
Entry for Proceedings Held Before Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, Epic Games, Inc. v.
Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640 (May 24, 2021), ECF No. 753. And the district court issued
its ruling, now on appeal, on September 10, 2021. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20cv-05640-YGR, 2021 WL 4128925 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021).
120. See News by the Ton: 75 Years of U.S. Advertising, BENEDICT EVANS (June 15,
2020), https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2020/6/14/75-years-of-us-advertising
[https://perma.cc/QQ89-8NUL] (observing that the “advertising share of GDP started sliding immediately after the Dotcom bubble, had a major step down in the financial crisis and
has been suspiciously flat ever since. . . . The economy grew and advertising didn’t get its
historic share of that growth.”).
121. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., WPU365, PRODUCER PRICE INDEX BY COMMODITY: ADVERTISING SPACE AND TIME SALES: INTERNET ADVERTISING SALES, EXCLUDING
INTERNET ADVERTISING SOLD BY PRINT PUBLISHERS (2021), https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU365 [https://perma.cc/B8K2-C43T] (showing that Producer
Price Index for Internet advertising, excluding that sold by print publishers, declined
around 35% between December 2009 and June 2021).
122. In 2018, Amazon was the top global spender on R&D ($22.6 billion); Google parent Alphabet was second ($16.2 billion); Microsoft was sixth ($12.3 billion); Apple, seventh
($11.6 billion); and Facebook, fourteenth ($7.8 billion). See M. Szmigiera, Ranking of the
20 Companies with the Highest Spending on Research and Development in 2018, STATISTA
(Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking-of-the-20-companieswith-the-highest-spending-on-research-and-development [https://perma.cc/3MSANGMD].
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and Ecosia offer enhanced privacy.123 On web browsers, consumers can
select between products that allow third-party cookies by default and
those that block them, and if they do not like the preset default on their
preferred browser, they can typically change it.124 While it is of course
possible that product and service quality might be even better in digital
markets if there were greater competition, the existing and ever-improving product and service quality in such markets does not indicate that
antitrust law’s slowness has allowed market power to run amok.
Nor does it appear that reliance on antitrust law has permitted harms
in the form of reduced innovation and entrepreneurship in digital markets. In its recently released report on competition in digital markets, the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee asserted
that since the advent of the major digital platforms: (1) “[t]he number of
new technology firms in the digital economy has declined”; (2) “the entrepreneurship rate—the share of startups and young firms in the [high
technology] industry as a whole—has also fallen significantly”; and (3)
“[u]nsurprisingly, there has also been a sharp reduction in early-stage
funding for technology startups.”125 Examined closely, however, those
claims do not withstand scrutiny. In support of the first two, the House
Judiciary Report cited a study based on data ending in 2011.126 As Benedict Evans has observed, “standard industry data shows that startup investment rounds have actually risen at least 4x since then.”127 In support
of the third claim, the House Judiciary Report cited statistics from an
article noting that the number and aggregate size of the very smallest
venture capital deals—those under $1 million—fell between 2014 and
2018 (after growing substantially from 2008 to 2014).128 The House Re123. See Privacy Policy, DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/privacy [https://
perma.cc/H2EM-QAZF]; Our Privacy Policy, STARTPAGE, https://www.startpage.com/en/
privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/E788-A4JX]; Privacy, ECOSIA, https://info.ecosia.org/privacy [https://perma.cc/2RK9-FEXH].
124. See Michal Wlosik, How Different Browsers Handle First-Party and Third-Party
Cookies, CLEARCODE (Dec. 17, 2020), https://clearcode.cc/blog/browsers-first-third-partycookies/#C1 [https://perma.cc/BMY7-Q9S6]. Ironically, legal efforts to enhance platform
competition may pose a hurdle to further privacy innovation, as smaller ad tech companies
are now accusing Google of impairing their ability to compete by providing privacy protections its users are demanding. See Ronan Shields, Google Kills the Cookie, Leaving Digital
Media Companies Craving a New Way Forward, ADWEEK (Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.adweek.com/programmatic/google-kills-the-cookie-leaving-digital-media-companiescraving-a-new-way-forward [https://perma.cc/L8RK-8WZK].
125. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 46–47 (2020).
126. Id. at 47 n.171 (citing IAN HATHWAY, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., TECH
STARTS: HIGH-TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS FORMATION AND JOB CREATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 (2013), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/bdstechstartsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU62-UXS9]).
127. The Regulator’s Puzzle, BENEDICT EVANS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2020/12/03/the-regulators-puzzle [https://perma.cc/7LGU-C82X].
128. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 n.172 (2020) (citing
Gené Teare, Decade in Review: Trends in Seed- and Early-Stage Funding, CRUNCHBASE
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port failed to note, however, the cited article’s observation that small venture deals ($1 million to $5 million) had not dropped and that larger
venture deals (>$5 million) had grown substantially during the same time
period.129 Nor did the House Report acknowledge that venture capital
funding has continued to increase since 2019.130 The House Report authors appear to have cherry-picked a small and isolated data set to support their claim that the advent of the digital platforms has led to a
“sharp reduction” in funding for technology start-ups.
None of this is to suggest that there are no competitive problems in
markets involving digital platforms. The question at hand is simply
whether antitrust law is “too slow” for such markets, as CMA economist
Walker and other advocates of direct regulation have suggested.131 If
market-power symptoms indeed grew prevalent in such markets before
antitrust law could do its job, antitrust law’s slowness could warrant a
different, perhaps more error-prone approach. But despite the sheer size
of today’s digital platforms, the markets in which they participate have
yet to exhibit severe market-power symptoms, and antitrust adjudication
is proceeding apace. It seems, then, that neither a lack of determinacy nor
excessive slowness justifies jettisoning antitrust law as the remedy for
market power in markets involving digital platforms—at least not at the
current moment.
B. Ex Ante Conduct Rules
The chief limitation of ex ante conduct rules is that they often generate
costly errors because the planners promulgating generally applicable, resource-allocating directives outside a particular, examinable factual context lack the information needed to determine in advance which precise
behaviors will reduce market output and which will enhance it.132 When
it comes to conduct rules that apply uniformly to disparate digital platforms, this Hayekian knowledge problem is likely to be severe.133
Of course, efforts to predict how the knowledge problem will bedevil
particular conduct rules are themselves subject to knowledge problem
concerns. It is not difficult, however, to identify risks of errors that particular conduct rules may generate. We therefore briefly consider how several of the leading proposed conduct rules for digital platforms could end
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://technologycrunch.com/2019/03/16/decade-in-review-trendsin-seed-and-early-stagefunding [https://perma.cc/7YJA-5EF3]).
129. See Teare, supra note 128.
130. Joanna Glasner, North American Venture Investment Rose in 2020, Culminating
with Big Exits and a Strong Q4, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://
news.crunchbase.com/news/north-america-venture-investing-2020-report [https://perma.cc/
2Y99-U9BA].
131. See Reviving Competition Hearing, supra note 102, at 1–2 (testimony of Dr. Mike
Walker, Chief Economic Advisor, U.K. Competition and Markets Authority).
132. See generally Hayek, supra note 86, at 519–20.
133. See Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1956 (“[B]road regulation is ill-suited for digital
platforms because they are so disparate.”).
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up reducing social welfare by wrongly forbidding output-enhancing conduct or wrongly requiring behaviors that reduce market output.
1. Structural Separations
In her presidential campaign, Senator Elizabeth Warren famously proposed to ban companies operating major digital platforms from competing on their own platforms.134 The staff of the House Judiciary
Committee later recommended that Congress consider “structural separation and line of business restrictions,” explaining that “[s]tructural separations prohibit a dominant intermediary from operating in markets that
place the intermediary in competition with the firms dependent on its
infrastructure. Line of business restrictions, meanwhile, generally limit
the markets in which a dominant firm can engage.”135 In June 2021, members of the House Judiciary Committee responded by advancing a bill
that would mandate structural separations and line of business restrictions for the largest digital platforms.136
Under the proposed Ending Platform Monopolies Act, Amazon could
not sell its private label Amazon Basics products on Amazon.com,
Google could not feature its own content on Google Search, and Apple
could not provide apps that compete with those for sale in its App
Store.137 The thinking is that, by insulating third-party sellers on a plat134. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM: TEAM
WARREN (March 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-upbig-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/26YG-YWG5] (proposing that platform operators
with more than $25 billion in annual revenues be precluded from making offerings on their
own platforms). Senator Warren later included in a draft bill a provision declaring that
“[s]erving as both a platform and a merchant that competes with third-party merchants” is
“a presumptive abuse of market power.” Elizabeth Warren, Anti-Monopoly and Competition Restoration Act § 6 (b)(4)(D) (Mar. 10, 2020) (unfinished draft of legislation), https://
www.hausfeld.com/uploads/documents/2019_12_02_warren_draft_antitrust_bill.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/Z9D5-WDAE].
135. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 379 (2020).
136. Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. §§ 2(a)–(b) (2021).
137. The bill provides that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for a covered platform operator to own, control, or
have a beneficial interest in a line of business other than the covered platform that—
(1) utilizes the covered platform for the sale or provision of products or
services;
(2) offers a product or service that the covered platform requires a business user to purchase or utilize as a condition for access to the covered
platform, or as a condition for preferred status or placement of a business
user’s product or services on the covered platform; or
(3) gives rise to a conflict of interest.
Id. § 2(a). The bill then provides that a “conflict of interest” will arise when:
(1) a covered platform operator owns or controls a line of business, other
than the covered platform; and
(2) the covered platform’s ownership or control of that line of business
creates the incentive and ability for the covered platform to—
(A) advantage the covered platform operator’s own products, services,
or lines of business on the covered platform over those of a competing
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form from competition with the platform provider that may have a competitive advantage derived from its access to information about platform
transactions, the restrictions will encourage third-party sellers to invest
more in innovation, production, and marketing.138
Of course, banning platform operators from competing with firms that
use their platforms reduces immediate competition in the markets from
which platform operators are excluded.139 Line of business restrictions
may even entrench dominant incumbents by preventing large digital platforms—the very firms best positioned for success—from entering the incumbents’ markets. Apple, for example, could not create a search engine
to compete with Google on the iPhone, as it has apparently contemplated.140 Proponents of structural separations apparently assume that
these reductions in competition will be outweighed by an increase in future competition as third-party sellers, freed from concern about being
undersold or disadvantaged by the platforms they utilize, innovate and
grow.141
But that is a speculative gamble. Regulators have no way of knowing
that the “bird in the hand” of increased competition from platform operators’ market participation is of less social value than the “bird in the
bush” of having stronger and more innovative third-party sellers in the
future. Indeed, given platform operators’ interest in assuring high-quality
offerings on their platforms, it seems unlikely that they would take steps
today that would reduce future innovation by or substantially weaken
platform participants. That would suggest that the marginal benefits of a
structural separations rule could be meager, while the marginal cost of
precluding platform operators from competing today appears to be great.
To continue with the bird analogy, mandating structural separations may
be like releasing a resplendent quetzal to chase after a common sparrow.
business or a business that constitutes nascent or potential competition
to the covered platform operator; or
(B) exclude from, or disadvantage, the products, services, or lines of
business on the covered platform of a competing business or a business
that constitutes nascent or potential competition to the covered platform
operator.
Id. § 2(b). The term “covered platform” includes any online platform that (1) has at least
50 million monthly active U.S. users or 100,000 monthly active U.S. business users, (2) is
owned or controlled by a company with net annual sale or a market capitalization of at
least $600 billion (adjusted for inflation), and (3) “is a critical trading partner for the sale
or provision of any product or service offered on or directly related to the online platform.” Id. § 5(5)(B).
138. MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 378–79 (2020).
139. Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 1085–86 (2019).
140. See Tim Bradshaw & Patrick McGee, Apple Develops Alternative to Google
Search, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/fd311801-e863-41fe-82cf3d98c4c47e26 [https://perma.cc/9TWV-L93E].
141. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 139, at 1085.
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In any event, whether banning platform operators from competing on
their platforms would occasion a net loss or gain would vary from platform to platform and market to market.142 Many Amazon Basics offerings, for example, are commodity products sold in markets featuring
strong brands with high profit margins (e.g., Amazon Basics batteries are
commodities that compete with high-margin brands like Energizer and
Duracell).143 Amazon’s participation as a seller in such markets is highly
unlikely to discourage valuable innovation—there is little to be had on
basic commodity products—but it creates valuable price competition by
offering consumers a less expensive option from a trusted supplier. The
sort of structural separations rule promoted by Senator Warren and imposed by the Ending Platform Monopolies Act would misfire badly in this
particular context.
2. Self-Preferencing Bans
The information and offerings presented to consumers on user home
screens, search engines, social networks, app stores, or e-commerce sites
must always be displayed in some order, and consumers typically pay
most attention to the most conspicuous offerings.144 “Self-preferencing
bans” preclude digital platforms from affording a more favorable ranking
or offering placement to the platform’s own products or services than to
similar products and services offered by third-parties participating on the
platform.145 Such bans are a key component of the Digital Markets Act
currently under consideration in the European Union146 and two bills recently advanced by the respective Judiciary Committees of the U.S.
House and Senate.147
142. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1956 (highlighting key differences
among dominant platforms as “broad regulation is ill-suited for digital platforms because
they are so disparate”).
143. Aditya Kalra & Steve Stecklow, Amazon Copied Products and Rigged Search Results to Promote Its Own Brands, Documents Show, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2021), https://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/amazon-india-rigging [https://perma.cc/C4V3MTJT].
144. Prakhar Khanna, Google Now Wants You to Scroll Forever on Its Search for Mobile, DIGIT. TRENDS (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/google-searchchanges-scroll-forever [https://perma.cc/L7YS-KSZ3].
145. See D. BRUCE HOFFMAN & GARRETT D. SHINN, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., SELF-PREFERENCING AND ANTITRUST: HARMFUL SOLUTIONS FOR AN IMPROBABLE
PROBLEM 3 (2021), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/cpi—
hoffman—final-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ3N-FWVE].
146. See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(d) (“[A] gatekeeper shall . . .
refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar
services or products of third party and apply fair and nondiscriminatory conditions to such
ranking[.]”).
147. See American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)
(2021) (precluding operator of a covered platform from “(1) advantag[ing] the covered
platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business over those of another business user; (2) exclud[ing] or disadvantag[ing] the products, services, or lines of business of
another business user relative to the covered platform’s own products, services, or lines of
business; or (3) discriminat[ing] among similarly situated business users”); id. § 2(b)(7)
(making it unlawful “in connection with any user interfaces, including search or ranking
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Proponents of self-preferencing bans contend that they are needed to
preserve platform participants’ incentives to innovate and enhance the
quality of their offerings: why do so if your offering may be unfairly buried?148 But self-preferencing bans do not preclude platforms from elevating their own offerings when they deserve more favorable placement—
preventing this would harm consumers by obscuring the most attractive
options and reducing the platform’s incentive to offer consumers a better
deal.149 Prohibitions on self-preferencing, therefore, require the regulator
to develop some sort of “deservingness” criteria.
That is a tall order. Any such criteria would have to assess multiple
factors, and the identity and relative weight of those factors would vary
from offering to offering and platform to platform. The popularity of an
offering (the number of user clicks, etc.) could not be the sole criterion
for determining deservingness and thus display prominence because past
display prominence may itself have influenced an offering’s popularity.
For one thing, it is more convenient for users to avail themselves of prominently displayed offerings. In addition, many offerings, such as those for
dating apps, exhibit network effects where their value to users depends
on how many other users have adopted them, which in turn depends on
display prominence.150 Thus, determining true deservingness, which must
be done to identify instances of illicit (undeserved) self-preferencing, requires regulators to specify ex ante what would make one offering superior to another in the absence of any benefits from favorable placement.
Regulators are not well-placed to make these sorts of judgments, and if
they get the deservingness formula wrong or if their formula becomes
outdated, offerings will be displayed in a way that degrades the user
experience.
Platform operators already have an incentive to afford prominent
placement to the most deserving offerings, as users are more likely to
return to the platform if they can easily find the offerings that best meet
their needs. It is perhaps possible that a platform might reason that its
benefits from promoting its own inferior offering exceed its benefits from
functionality offered by the covered platform, [to] treat the covered platform operator’s
own products, services, or lines of business more favorably than those of another business
user”); American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2021)
(making it unlawful for a person operating a covered platform to “unfairly preference the
covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business over those of another business user on the covered platform in a manner that would materially harm competition on the covered platform”).
148. See MAJORITY STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 382 (2020) (“Without the
opportunity to compete fairly, businesses and entrepreneurs are dissuaded from investing
and, over the long term, innovation suffers.”).
149. For example, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act precludes “unfairly
preferenc[ing] the covered platform operator’s own products, services, or lines of business.” S. 2992 § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
150. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Tiffany, The Tinder Algorithm, Explained, VOX (Mar. 18, 2019,
12:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/7/18210998/tinder-algorithm-swiping-tips-datingapp-science [https://perma.cc/GEK8-3MTR].
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providing the best arrangement of offerings to its users, but it seems unlikely that a platform operator would often run the risk of losing platform
users to secure marginally more sales or uses of its own inferior offering.
Accordingly, a self-preferencing ban would likely provide little benefit to
consumers. And because such a ban would require regulators to create a
myriad of complicated deservingness formulae that they are ill-equipped
to craft and maintain over time, such a ban is likely, in the end, to require
offering placements that do not optimize users’ platform experiences.151
3. Requirements that Platform Users Be Permitted to Remove PreInstalled Software, Side-Load Apps, and Use Alternative
Payment Systems
Several ex ante conduct rules appearing in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act and recently advanced U.S. House and Senate bills,
though seemingly minor, would undermine business models currently in
use in digital platform markets. The planners’ apparent assumption is that
the benefits of upending those models would exceed any resulting costs.
But that is far from clear.
One of the proposed rules would ban platforms from preventing users
from uninstalling any pre-installed software or apps if they wish to do
so.152 The planners’ theory is that users are unlikely to install software
competing with a pre-installed offering if doing so would reduce available
memory on a device.153 For example, if the Google Search app or
Google’s Chrome browser cannot be removed from an Android phone or
tablet, freeing up available memory, a user is less likely to install
DuckDuckGo’s search app or Mozilla’s Firefox browser. And, of course,
151. Self-preferencing bans may also undermine business models that have proven
quite attractive to consumers. For example, platform operators sometimes provide access
to their platforms for free but then earn revenues from additional services they provide on
the platforms, as when Google gives free access to its Android mobile operating system but
earns search advertising revenue from the use of Google Search on the Android platform.
See infra notes 164–70 and accompanying text. Absent the ability to preference its revenue-generating offerings on its platform, a platform operator would be less likely to offer
its platform for free. See infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. See also Adam
Kovacevich, A Closer Look: How Senator Klobuchar’s Bill Would Ban Amazon Prime,
MEDIUM (Nov. 2, 2021), https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/a-closer-look-how-senator-klobuchars-bill-would-ban-amazon-prime-aa57dd5d22c0 [https://perma.cc/4XJ2-LV7F]
(arguing that self-preferencing ban in American Innovation and Choice Online Act would
effectively preclude Amazon’s popular free-shipping subscription service).
152. See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(b) (requiring that a gatekeeper
“allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform
service”); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(5) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede covered platform users from un-installing software applications that have
been preinstalled on the covered platform or changing default settings that direct or steer
covered platform users to products or services offered by the covered platform operator”);
S. 2992 § 2(b)(5) (making it illegal “unless necessary for the security or functioning of the
covered platform, [to] materially restrict or impede covered platform users from un-installing software applications that have been preinstalled on the covered platform or changing
default settings that direct or steer covered platform users to products or services offered
by the covered platform operator”).
153. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, ¶ 47.
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the more difficult it is for rivals to secure installation of their offerings,
the less likely they are to invest in them.
An additional set of proposed rules would restrict how digital platforms may manage and earn revenue from their app ecosystems. Under
the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, the American Choice and
Online Innovation Act pending in the U.S. House of Representatives,
and the Open App Markets Act recently advanced by the Senate Judiciary Committee, digital platforms must allow users to download apps produced by third parties outside the platform’s own app store (sideloading),154 allow any third-party app developer to direct users outside its
app to complete a transaction initiated within the app,155 and permit
users to utilize a third-party payment system to close any in-app
purchases.156 The Digital Markets Act further requires that platform operators allow free use on an app of any digital goods purchased outside
the app or without using the platform’s in-app purchasing system.157 So,
for example, Apple could not preclude iPhone users from downloading
apps like Epic Games’ Fortnite app outside Apple’s proprietary App

154. Id. art. (6)(1)(c) (requiring gatekeeper to “allow the installation and effective use
of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating
with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or
software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services
of that gatekeeper”); H.R. 3816 § 2(b)(9) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede a business user, or a business user’s customers or users, from
interoperating or connecting to any product or service”); Open App Markets Act, S. 2710,
117th Cong. § 3(d) (2022); Rebecca Klar, Senate Panel Advances Bill Targeting Apple,
Google App Store Power, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2022, 1:53 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/592692-senate-panel-advances-bill-targeting-apple-google-app-store-power [https://
perma.cc/4PCE-FT4L].
155. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service”); H.R.
3816 § 2(b)(6) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede
business users from communicating information or providing hyperlinks on the covered
platform to covered platform users to facilitate business transactions”); S. 2710 § 3(b) (“A
Covered Company shall not impose restrictions on communications of developers with the
users of the App through an App or direct outreach to a user concerning legitimate business offers, such as pricing terms and product or service offerings”).
156. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to . . . conclude contracts with . . . end users regardless of whether for that
purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not”); id. art. 5(b) (requiring gatekeepers to “allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users
through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different
from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper”); H.R.
3816 § 2(b)(9) (making it illegal for operators of covered platforms to “restrict or impede a
business user, or a business user’s customers or users, from interoperating or connecting to
any product or service”); S. 2710 § 3(a)(1) (precluding each covered company from “requir[ing] developers to use an In-App Payment System owned or controlled by the Covered Company”).
157. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 5(c) (requiring gatekeepers to permit
“users to access and use, through the core platform services . . . content, subscriptions,
features or other items by using the software application of a business user, where these
items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using
the core platform services of the gatekeeper”).
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Store.158 Nor could it require users of the Fortnite iPhone app to employ
Apple’s In-App Purchase system to make purchases (e.g., of game addons like “skins”) while using the app.159 It also could not preclude
streaming music provider Spotify from directing users of its iPhone app to
its own website to purchase an upgraded Spotify Premium
subscription.160
The goal of these rules is to prevent dominant digital platforms from
exercising their market power to collect a supracompetitive share of revenues from sales of digital amenities used on the platforms.161 Apple, for
example, currently collects a revenue share—usually 30% but sometimes
less—on sales of paid iOS apps sold through its App Store (it receives
nothing for distributing free apps) and on in-app purchases of digital
goods bought within iOS apps.162 Google collects similar revenue shares
on sales of paid Android apps purchased through Google’s Play Store
and on in-app purchases using its Google Play Billing service.163
What the ban on uninstallable presets and the various restrictions on
app policies have in common is that each is likely to disrupt a business
model that has proven quite beneficial to consumers. The rule forbidding
unremovable software would strike a blow to platforms financed by the
use of preinstalled software. Creators of digital platforms have different
means of monetizing their creative endeavors.164 They may sell access to
the platform by bundling it with hardware that they sell. That is the approach Apple takes with its iOS operating system that is sold only with
Apple hardware products (iPhones and iPads).165 Alternatively, platform
158. Fortnite is a popular video game. Its producer, Epic Games, has challenged Apple’s policy of restricting side-loading. See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, at 19,
32–33.
159. Fortnite players may purchase digital outfits called “skins” for their digital avatars
while playing the game. Fortnite-maker Epic has challenged Apple’s requirement that
purchases made while using the iOS Fortnite app be made using Apple’s In-App Purchase
system, enabling Apple to collect a share of the revenue. See id. at 28–30.
160. In the European Union, streaming music service provider Spotify, a Swedish company, has challenged Apple’s refusal to permit it to direct users of its iOS app outside the
app to purchase upgrades to its premium service in order to avoid the commission Apple
charges on in-app purchases. See Spotify Files Complaint with European Commission
Against Apple, MUSIC ALLY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/03/13/spotify-complaint-european-commission-apple [https://perma.cc/G8KF-2JVU].
161. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, ¶ 57.
162. See App Store: Principles and Practices, APPLE (Oct. 18, 2021), https://
www.apple.com/tmua/ios/app-store/principles-practices [https://perma.cc/TQX6-YUVY].
App developers set their own prices for apps sold through the App Store, subject to a few
limitations by Apple. See Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (“Apple requires that the retail sales price end in $ 0.99, but otherwise allows the app developers to
set the retail price. Apple keeps 30 percent of the sales price, no matter what the sales
price might be.”).
163. See Service Fees, GOOGLE HELP: PLAY CONSOLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en [https://perma.cc/7QJM-R32E].
164. See Randy Picker, The European Commission Picks a Fight with Google Android
over Business Models, PROMARKET (July 23, 2018), https://promarket.org/2018/07/23/european-commission-picks-fight-google-android-business-models [https://perma.cc/WCQ7BB67] (discussing different revenue models of mobile operating systems producers).
165. See id.
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developers may license their platform software for a fee. Microsoft takes
that tack with its Windows Operating System, and it briefly did so with a
mobile operating system it licensed to original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) like Nokia.166 A third monetization approach is to license the
platform technology for free but include within it features that will generate revenue for the platform developer. That is the strategy Google has
taken with its Android operating system, which it licenses for free to
OEMs while creating incentives for them to include Google’s search engine and Chrome browser as unremovable features.167 Google recoups its
Android investments by earning search advertising revenues from Android users’ web searches on Google Search and by monetizing (through
targeted display advertising sales) user data gleaned from Android users’
web browsing on Chrome.168
Of course, platform operators that finance their creative efforts using
this third approach—free platforms incorporating revenue-generating
components—need to ensure consumer utilization of the revenue-generating parts of their bundle. If those components may be uninstalled to
free up space for competing offerings (e.g., other search engines, browsers, etc.), operators’ revenue per licensed platform will fall, requiring that
they either make up that shortfall with license fees or cut back on investments in the platform.169 This could deny consumers an alternative that
many appear to prefer: a high-quality, continually updated platform licensed at zero monetary cost.170
The rules requiring platform operators to permit app side-loading and
to allow the circumvention of in-app purchasing systems threaten to disrupt an app distribution model that ensures the quality and security of
third-party apps, fosters the development of new apps, encourages continued innovation by platform operators, and reduces deadweight loss in
the market for platforms.
Apps developed by third parties may do damage to the platform on
which they are operated or may otherwise degrade the user experience
on the platform. Accordingly, both providers and users of platforms have
an interest in ensuring that such apps are properly vetted. On the mobile
operating systems (primarily iOS and Android), such vetting occurs
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. The same is true if platform operators cannot preference (e.g., offered favored
placement to) their pre-installed revenue-generating offerings. See supra note 151.
170. Android’s high share of users in the U.S. (currently 40.5%) and its dominance over
Apple’s iOS globally (72% versus 27%) despite the similarity of the two platforms, suggest
that its business model provides great consumer value. Mobile Operating System Market
Share United States of America, STATCOUNTER GLOBAL STATS (April 2021), https://
gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america/#monthly-202104202104-bar [https://perma.cc/L7K2-4XBZ]; Mobile Operating System Market Share Worldwide, STATCOUNTER GLOBAL STATS (April 2021), https://gs.statcounter.com/os-marketshare/mobile/worldwide/#monthly-202104-202104-bar [https://perma.cc/9N55-S3N8].
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through app stores (Apple’s App Store and Google Play).171 Evaluating
and distributing digital goods, though, is costly. Apple and Google cover
those costs by collecting a revenue share on sales of paid apps distributed
through their app stores and by taking a cut of in-app purchases.172 To
ensure prompt collection of their revenue shares, Apple and Google require use of their proprietary in-app purchasing systems.173 This approach
allows the platforms to cover the cost of ensuring a trustworthy app
ecosystem.
The platforms’ revenue-sharing approach also has the benefit of subsidizing upstart apps and thereby encouraging app development.174 Because app developers are charged a percentage of revenues from app
sales and in-app purchases, developers of popular apps bear most of the
cost of sustaining the third-party app ecosystem.175 Developers of free
apps pay nothing, and developers of unpopular (or yet-to-be popular)
paid apps pay little. This means that app developers pay less early in the
life of their apps, when income is likely scant, in exchange for paying
more if and when their apps have proven successful and they are better
able to bear the cost of maintaining the third-party app ecosystem. This
system, which is analogous to Ramsey pricing for utilities,176 inures to the
benefit of consumers, as it subsidizes new apps and thereby encourages
app development. Though disfavored by producers of popular apps like
Fortnite and Spotify, the system likely enhances overall market output.
The current system may further encourage app development by reducing developers’ business risks. Platform producers often incorporate additional functionality into new versions of their product, perhaps as a paid
add-on.177 Accordingly, every app developer faces a risk that its app’s
functions will be incorporated into a subsequent version of the platform
itself or offered at a lower price by the platform provider, reducing de171. See Kif Leswing, Inside Apple’s Team that Greenlights iPhone Apps for the App
Store, CNBC (June 22, 2019, 1:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/21/how-apples-appreview-process-for-the-app-store-works.html [https://perma.cc/3R7E-SYMQ]; App Stores,
Trust, and Anti-Trust, BENEDICT EVANS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.ben-evans.com/
benedictevans/2020/8/18/app-stores [https://perma.cc/JR6U-3N38]; Ben Thompson, Apple,
Epic, and the App Store, STRATECHERY (Aug. 17, 2020), https://stratechery.com/2020/apple-epic-and-the-app-store [https://perma.cc/M3CK-Z89G].
172. See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 125; Epic v. Google Complaint,
supra note 39, ¶ 177.
173. See Epic v. Apple Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 132–34; Epic v. Google Complaint,
supra note 39, ¶ 178.
174. See Dirk Auer, The Epic Flaws of Epic’s Antitrust Gambit, TRUTH ON THE MKT.
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/08/27/the-epic-flaws-of-epics-antitrustgambit [https://perma.cc/HD4Q-B6TA].
175. They likely pass much of this cost on to consumers.
176. Ramsey pricing involves setting rates for different products or services (typically
price-regulated utilities) in inverse proportion to elasticity of demand—i.e., charging
higher mark-ups over marginal cost on products where customers are less likely to cut back
on purchases in response to a price increase. This allows the firm to cover its fixed costs of
production in a manner that maximizes market output. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at
165–66.
177. Producers of operating systems do this when they bundle new proprietary apps
into their operating systems or make those apps available in their app stores.

104

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

mand for the app. If mobile operating system producers can share in the
revenue from a popular third-party app, then they have less incentive to
incorporate the app’s functionality into their operating systems or sell a
competing app at a discount. Thus, as Dirk Auer has explained, “Apple
and Google’s 30% commissions can be seen as a soft commitment not to
expropriate developers, thus leaving them with a sizable share of the revenue generated on each platform.”178 The role such a commitment plays
in encouraging third-party app development may explain why the 30%
commission is fairly typical for app stores,179 including those operated by
gaming platforms.180
Finally, enabling firms to earn continuous profits off the digital platforms they create and maintain, as prevailing app store policies do, enhances output—both qualitatively and quantitatively—in the market for
platforms themselves. The prospect of continued profits from platform
use encourages actual and potential platform operators to invest in improving existing platforms and in the creation of new ones, and those
investments attract more potential customers for app developers.181 The
continuous revenue stream also permits platform operators to lower
prices elsewhere. Apple, for example, may charge less for an iPhone because it can earn revenues when the iPhone user buys apps and makes inapp purchases. Lowering prices for platform access (e.g., in the case of
iOS, cutting iPhone prices) reduces deadweight loss by enabling consumers with a lower, but still above-cost, reservation price to enter the
market.182
178. Auer, supra note 174.
179. See JONATHAN BORCK, JULIETTE CAMINADE & MARKUS VON WARTBURG, ANALYSIS GRP., APPLE’S APP STORE AND OTHER DIGITAL MARKETPLACES: A COMPARISON OF
COMMISSION RATES 5 (2020), https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketplaces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QPP8-26GQ].
180. See Tom Marks, Report: Steam’s 30% Cut Is Actually the Industry Standard, IGN
(Jan. 13, 2020, 10:30 PM), https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/10/07/report-steams-30-cut-isactually-the-industry-standard [https://perma.cc/KR95-HECA] (cataloguing the revenue
share collected by major gaming platforms). Although the Epic Games Store anomalously
collects a lower revenue percentage, see id., it also operates at a substantial loss, see Joao
Silva, The Epic Games Store Lost $454 Million in the Past Two Years, TECHSPOT (April 13,
2021, 7:29 AM), https://www.techspot.com/news/89276-epic-games-store-lost-454-millionpast-two.html [https://perma.cc/JZ63-HMZN].
181. See Auer, supra note 174 (“The ‘closed’ business model also gives Apple and
Google (as well as other platforms) significant incentives to develop new distribution mediums (smart TVs spring to mind) and improve existing ones. In turn, this greatly expands
the audience that software developers can reach.”).
182. This is akin to the “variable proportion tie-in” situation in which a firm with market power on one good (i.e. a printer) lowers its price from the profit-maximizing level but
ties in a complement (i.e. ink) priced at an above-cost level. High volume users will pay
more, but they will effectively subsidize lower volume users who might not enter the market at all if they had to pay the higher, single-product profit-maximizing price of the tying
product. A variable proportion tie-in of this sort typically enhances overall market output.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6(e) (6th ed. 2020).
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It seems unlikely that the benefits of rewriting long-standing app store
policies could justify the substantial costs entailed. If platforms are required to permit side-loading and to allow circumvention of the in-app
purchasing systems that collect the agreed-upon revenue share, they will
likely find other ways to recoup the costs of vetting and distributing apps
and to extract surplus from app developers and users. They could, for
example, charge app developers for access to critical application protocol
interfaces (APIs) necessary for app functionality.183 In the end, preventing platforms from collecting app revenue under their existing policies in
no way reduces their market power—they could extract the same amount
of surplus using different means—but it would impair a system that encourages more and better apps and greater output in the market for
platforms.184
4. Data-Portability, Data-Sharing, and Interoperability Mandates
Several proposed ex ante conduct rules for digital platforms aim to spur
interplatform competition. Data-portability, data-sharing, and interoperability mandates fall within this category. The European Union’s Digital
Markets Act features all three mandates.185 The Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act (ACCESS Act)
recently advanced by the House Judiciary Committee mandates data
portability and interoperability.186
183. See Auer, supra note 174. Apple currently offers its essential app development
tools to third-party app developers for free. See Choosing a Membership, APPLE DEV.,
https://developer.apple.com/support/compare-memberships [https://perma.cc/LBW2X5MS]. Epic Games has acknowledged that Apple has the ability to cut off its access to
those essential tools. See Jacob Kastrenakes, Epic Says Apple Threatens ‘Catastrophic’ Response in Two Weeks if Fortnite Doesn’t Comply with Rules, THE VERGE (Aug. 17, 2020,
3:06 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/17/21372480/apple-epic-threat-developer-toolsagreement-unreal-engine-fortnite [https://perma.cc/JZC3-ZJGH]. Apple could similarly
withhold those tools from third-party developers that failed to pay some upfront fee. The
current revenue-sharing approach provides an alternative means of monetizing Apple’s
control over its mobile operating system.
184. It is worth noting that under existing app store policies, the number of third-party
mobile apps available to consumers has exploded. When Apple and Google launched their
app stores in 2008, Apple’s store featured 500 apps, and Google’s around 50. See Luke
Dormehl, Today in Apple History: App Store Opens Its Virtual Doors, CULT OF MAC (July
10, 2021, 7:45 AM), https://www.cultofmac.com/491792/app-store-virtual-doors [https://
perma.cc/S8JG-UV57]; Android Market: Now Available for Users, ANDROID DEVS. BLOG
(Oct. 22, 2008), https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2008/10/android-market-nowavailable-for-users.html [https://perma.cc/5EBF-J3FZ]. As of the first quarter of 2021, 2.22
million iOS apps are available to consumers in Apple’s App Store, with Google’s Play
Store featuring 3.48 million Android apps. See Statista Research Department, Number of
Apps Available in Leading App Stores as of 1st Quarter 2021, STATISTA (Sep. 10, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores
[https://perma.cc/J4ZK-S2SF].
185. Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(j) (data-sharing mandate); id. art.
6(1)(f) (technological interoperability mandate); id. art. 6(1)(i) (data-interoperability
mandate).
186. Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act,
H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2021) (providing for data-portability and interoperability
mandates).
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Data-portability rules require that a platform’s users be allowed to
transfer data about themselves that the platform holds to other platforms.187 Depending on the particular rule, the data that must be portable could include “inputted” data that the user provides (e.g., photos,
user posts, or playlists), “observed” data that reflects the user’s use of the
platform (e.g., search or viewing history), or “inferred” data that the platform surmises based on the user’s platform activities (e.g., information on
the user’s interests or relationships).188 Proponents of data-portability
rules contend that they spur interplatform competition by lowering
switching costs and reducing user lock-in.189
Whereas data-portability requirements mandate that users be able to
transfer data about themselves in some defined format, data-sharing mandates require that other firms be allowed to access third-party data that
platforms have collected.190 One search engine, for example, may have to
provide other search engines with query, click, and view data generated
by its users.191 Requiring platforms to provide actual or potential rivals
with access to third-party data on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
terms has been hailed as a means of overcoming the “data barrier to entry” that may exist in markets in which vast quantities of user data may
be required to compete effectively.192
Interoperability mandates require that platforms be designed in a way
that makes it easy for the platforms to interact with competing or complementary businesses.193 Technological interoperability mandates seek to
187. See Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(h) (mandating that a gatekeeper
shall “provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user
or end user and shall, in particular, provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of
data portability, in line with Regulation EU 2016/679, including by the provision of continuous and real-time access”); H.R. 3849 § 3(a) (mandating that platforms “maintain a set of
transparent, third-party accessible interfaces (including application programming interfaces) to enable the secure transfer of data to a user, or with the affirmative consent of a
user, to a business user at the direction of a user, in a structured, commonly used, and
machine-readable format”).
188. See DIGIT. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2.54–2.55
189. Id. ¶¶ 2.48–2.67.
190. Angela Chen, Making Big Tech Companies Share Data Could Do More Good than
Breaking Them Up, MIT TECH. REV. (June 6, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2019/06/06/135067/making-big-tech-companies-share-data-could-do-more-good-thanbreaking-them-up [https://perma.cc/HFK6-X8TE].
191. See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. (6)(1)(j) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall provide third-party platforms “access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking, query, click and view data in relation to free and paid search
generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper, subject to anonymisation for the query, click and view data that constitutes personal data”).
192. Id. ¶ 56 (“Access by gatekeepers to such ranking, query, click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion, which undermines the contestability
of online search engine services. Gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access, on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to these ranking, query, click and
view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search
engine services to other providers of such services, so that these third-party providers can
optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services.”).
193. See, e.g., H.R. 3849 § 4(a) (“A covered platform shall maintain a set of transparent, third-party accessible interfaces (including application programming interfaces) to fa-
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ensure that other businesses can utilize a platform’s functionality.194 Such
mandates might be designed, for example, to ensure that messages sent
from a user on one messaging platform can be read by someone using
another. Technological interoperability may help overcome direct network effects—the situation in which a particular offering (such as a social
network or messaging service) becomes more attractive as more people
use it.195 If users of one social network or messaging service can easily
interact with users of another, there is less need to be on the dominant
platform, and smaller platforms may be able to enter the market, gain a
foothold, and compete.
Another form of interoperability requirement, which we may call a
data-interoperability mandate, obligates a platform to make the data it
holds about a business user and its on-platform interactions continuously
available to the business user in a format it can access on demand.196 This
sort of mandate differs from both a data-portability mandate (because it
does not require that the user be able to transfer the data to another
firm) and a data-sharing mandate (because it does not require the provision of third-party data). It is a type of interoperability mandate because
it requires that the platform be designed in a manner that provides users
with continuous, real-time access, which requires an interface that users
may plug in to and access data about themselves as they desire. Such a
mandate ensures that business users who are helping provide data to the
platform can themselves use that data, perhaps to engage in competition
with the platform. It may also spur competition among platforms vying
for business users—e-commerce platforms, digital advertising services,
etc.—by ensuring that such users can easily monitor how the platform is
performing for them.
In mandating data portability, data sharing, and technological and data
interoperability, regulatory planners assume that the competitive benefits
their conduct rules will achieve will exceed the costs they will impose.
Again, however, that is not clear.
Consider data portability. The fact that users tend to “multi-home” in
digital platform markets, participating simultaneously on multiple competing platforms, suggests that a lack of data portability is not a great
cilitate and maintain interoperability with a competing business or a potential competing
business . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., id.; Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6(1)(f) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall “allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are
available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services”).
195. See STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, 16.
196. See, e.g., Digital Markets Act, supra note 73, art. 6.1(i) (mandating that a gatekeeper shall “provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user, free of
charge, with effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated
or non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the
relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the
products or services provided by those business users”).
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impediment to utilizing new platforms.197 In recent years, numerous digital platforms hosting user-provided data have started and grown quite
large without new users’ porting their data from other platforms to the
upstart. TikTok, for example, was launched in 2016 and already has
around 700 million monthly active users (including 100 million in North
America)198 and was the most downloaded app in both 2020 and 2021.199
Moreover, the benefits of a data-portability mandate are lessened by
the fact that major digital platforms are in the process of voluntarily facilitating data transfers. The Data Transfer Project (DTP), a collaboration
between Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and Apple, is creating
API standards to enable users to transfer their data between participating
services.200 Participants in this voluntary project, which will be opensource so that other platforms can participate,201 are well-positioned to
develop means of interplatform data sharing while taking care to preserve users’ privacy. The marginal benefits of a government-designed
data-sharing mandate, then, may not be that great.
At the same time, the costs of such a mandate may be significant. First,
there are the direct administrative costs of making data portable. Proponents of data portability analogize to the local telephone number portability requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,202 but actual
data-portability proposals tend to be far more complicated and costlier to
implement.203 Luigi Zingales and Guy Rolnick, for example, have pro197. As of 2021, the average 18-to-34-year-old American using social media had an
average of 8.4 accounts. See 70+ Social Media Stats You Need to Know, OMNICORE
AGENCY, https://www.omnicoreagency.com/social-media-statistics [https://perma.cc/N7WY
-A6ZU]. Business users also engage in significant multi-homing. See EGIDIJUS
BARCEVIC̆IŪS, DOVYDAS CATURIANAS, ANDREW LEMING & GABIJA SKARDZ̆IÛTË, EUR.
COMM’N, STUDY ON “SUPPORT TO THE OBSERVATORY FOR THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY” 12, 38 (2021) https://platformobservatory.eu/app/uploads/2021/01/AP-7-Multihoming-Jan-2021-EC-final-for-pbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT32-AHRH].
198. Mansoor Iqbal, TikTok Revenue and Usage Statistics, BUS. OF APPS (Sep. 28,
2021), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/#4 [https://perma.cc/5CH2QA9Q].
199. TikTok Named as the Most Downloaded App of 2020, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58155103 [https://perma.cc/6A2P-EWTN]; Most
Downloaded Apps of 2021: TikTok Tops the List Followed by Instagram and Facebook,
MONEYCONTROL (Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/technology/mostdownloaded-apps-of-2021-tiktok-tops-the-list-followed-by-instagram-and-facebook7886321.html [https://perma.cc/YJQ5-27UT].
200. See DATA TRANSFER PROJECT, DATA TRANSFER PROJECT OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS 6 (2018), https://datatransferproject.dev/dtp-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9P6W-H6BS]; Russell Brandom, Apple Joins Google, Facebook, and Twitter in Data-Sharing Project, THE VERGE (July 30, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/30/
20746868/apple-data-transfer-project-google-microsoft-twitter [https://perma.cc/MWW3Y4QU].
201. DATA TRANSFER PROJECT, supra note 200, at 3.
202. 47 U.S.C. § 251.
203. And even the telephone number-portability mandate was costly to implement,
though its benefits were undoubtedly great. See Gus Hurwitz, Portable Social Media Aren’t
Like Portable Phone Numbers, TECH POL’Y PRESS (Mar. 8, 2021), https://techpolicy.press/
portable-social-media-arent-like-portable-phone-numbers [https://perma.cc/4R7A-RHBR]
(“[M]aking even simple phone numbers portable across carriers proved to be quite difficult. It took several years and the establishment of a new private regulatory entity, the
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posed a “social graph mobility” mandate that would enable users to
transfer the information about all the relationships they have established
on one platform to another.204 As Geoffrey Manne and Sam Bowman
have observed, this is a far cry from telephone number portability: “Requiring social graph portability would be much more like requiring that a
phone company provide competing phone companies with all the
metadata related to an individual’s use of a phone network so that the
new company could tailor a custom phone book for the new user.”205
As the costs of data-portability mandates rise, as they will when the
scope of data that must be portable expands, the mandates may perversely tend to entrench incumbent platforms by making market entry
more difficult for upstarts who must themselves comply with the portability mandates.206 Entry may also be deterred by the fact that an upstart
cannot rely on “data stickiness” to keep users around long enough to
develop an affinity for its platform.207 And existing platforms may engage
in less innovation because data portability requires that they hold data in
a common format, reducing their ability to make changes.208
Requiring data portability also threatens user privacy. When data is
held in a common, transferable format, it may be easier for malicious
actors to access.209 In addition, even a user-authorized transfer of some
data may impair the privacy rights of other users. For example, if user A
agrees to connect with user B on platform X, she may not want that connection known to users or administrators of platform Y.210 If B can easily
transfer his social graph from X to Y, A may never agree to connect with
B in the first instance. Just as a person might not want to invite members
of her different friend groups to the same dinner party, she may value the
ability to segregate relationships on digital platforms. Data-portability
mandates impede her ability to do so and could keep her off platforms
altogether, squandering value that could otherwise be obtained.
As with data-portability mandates, the benefits of data-sharing requirements may not justify the costs they would entail. When it comes to generating success for a digital platform, the ability to process data—to mine
Number Portability Administration Center, to allow portability just of local phone
numbers.”).
204. Luigi Zingales & Guy Rolnick, A Way to Own Your Social-Media Data, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/opinion/social-data-googlefacebook-europe.html [https://perma.cc/J5KH-S92J].
205. GEOFFREY A. MANNE & SAM BOWMAN, INT’L CTR. FOR L. & ECON., ISSUE BRIEF:
DATA PORTABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY 17 (2020), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2020/09/Data-Portability-Paper-v4-2020-09-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/32KH3UQX].
206. Id. at 11–12.
207. See Luı́s Cabral, Dynamic Pricing in Customer Markets with Switching Costs, 20
REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 43, 55 (2016) (“In a competitive environment, switching costs have
two effects. First, switching costs increase the market power of a seller with attached customers. Second, switching costs increase competition for new customers.”).
208. MANNE & BOWMAN, supra note 205, at 18.
209. Id. at 20.
210. Id. at 6.
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it and draw insights that can be used to craft attractive offerings for consumers—appears to be far more important than merely possessing
data.211 Firms that have developed superior abilities to use data in a productive fashion have succeeded despite the lack of significant amounts of
data at the outset; the promise of their offerings has attracted users that
have provided the data they need. WhatsApp in messaging, King Digital
in social gaming, and Tinder in online dating have all thrived, despite an
initial lack of data in markets in which data access is important to success,
because they developed superior data processing tools and used the data
at their disposal to create more attractive offerings.212 And, of course,
Google and Facebook, with virtually no start-up data, dislodged seemingly entrenched players in search and social networking because they
figured out better ways of contextualizing the data at their disposal.213 If
data processing abilities are the real key to success, as experience would
suggest, then mandating large dumps of unprocessed data is unlikely to
spur competition significantly.
The cost of mandating data sharing, however, may be substantial. If
regulators require platforms to provide access to the data they have
amassed, the regulators will have to set a price (possibly zero) for the
data. Determining the appropriate price is tricky. Given differences in the
costs of collecting different bits of data and in the value those different
bits confer, and the fact that both collection costs and value conferred are
likely to differ from platform to platform, an elaborate pricing schedule
would be required.214 Regulators, however, are poorly positioned to set
prices, and any mistakes they make may undermine the data-sharing
mandate. If they set prices too high, upstarts will not acquire data, and
the mandate will be pointless. If they set prices too low, incumbents will
have less incentive to gather data in the first place, something that they
typically do by creating attractive offerings for consumers whose behavior
they can then observe.215 If data-sharing requirements end up conferring
211. Id. at 11 ( “[T]he real value of a large agglomeration of data comes not in the data
per se, but in the analysis of the data”); ANJA LAMBRECHT & CATHERINE E. TUCKER,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., CAN BIG DATA PROTECT A FIRM FROM
COMPETITION? 11 (2017), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/CPI-Lambrecht-Tucker.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB2N-N6CY] (“It is only
when combined with managerial, engineering and analytic skill in determining the experiment or algorithm to apply to such data that it proves valuable to firms.”).
212. MANNE & BOWMAN, supra note 205, at 14.
213. Id.
214. See Lambert, supra note 118, at 1128.
215. Grocery stores’ loyalty card programs, for example, provide discounts to consumers in exchange for swiping a card when making purchases. See MANNE & BOWMAN, supra
note 205, at 18 (offering example involving grocers Kroger and Aldi). A primary objective
of the programs, which benefit consumers, is to collect data for marketing purposes. Id. If a
grocery store that had developed a loyalty card program were forced to share the data
collected with a competitor who had not developed such a program, the store sponsoring
the loyalty program would have less incentive to “pay” for data by giving discounts to
encourage participation in the program. Id. If a competitor’s price for the data were too
low, the loyalty card sponsor might decide that the program was no longer conferring competitive benefits sufficient to justify its cost and might scrap the program altogether. Id.
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little benefit on upstarts while reducing the incentive of incumbents to
create consumer amenities that generate data for their sponsors, they
may reduce market output and consumer welfare.
Interoperability mandates may reduce market output and harm consumers because they impede commercial flexibility and innovation and
may make it difficult for platforms to provide the level of data security
that many consumers appear to desire.216 Both technological and data
interoperability require adherence to some kind of standard. This restricts a platform’s ability to innovate in any way that departs from that
standard format or might otherwise impair the functionality of third-party
apps connected to the platform.217 Data interoperability—making data
continuously available to some group of users in real time and on demand—increases the difficulty of ensuring data security. The security of a
data collection depends on the number, size, and accessibility of points at
which bad actors might infiltrate the collection. Mandating points of data
access for platform users, as data interoperability requirements do, increases a platform’s “attack surface,” rendering it less secure.218
None of this is to say that the marginal costs of data portability, data
sharing, and interoperability mandates definitively outweigh the benefits
such mandates would secure. Neither we nor the planners crafting these
mandates know the balance of costs and benefits in any particular context. What we can state with confidence is that the balance is sure to
differ from context to context and platform to platform. And that is precisely the problem with requiring data portability, data sharing, and interoperability via ex ante rules.219 Such rules are certain to misfire more than
a standards-based approach that customizes directives for particular
contexts.
C. AGENCY OVERSIGHT
In light of antitrust law’s relative slowness and the tendency of ex ante
conduct rules to produce high error costs because of the knowledge problem, the agency oversight model appears to combine the relative advantages of each approach: antitrust’s ability to contextualize directives
through the use of flexible standards and direct regulation’s ability to act
quickly without awaiting the resolution of a lawsuit. The United Kingdom
recently embraced this model in launching a Digital Markets Unit
216. Id. at 18–20.
217. Id. at 18. The ACCESS Act, for example, prohibits covered platforms from
“mak[ing] a change that may affect its interoperability interface” absent prior approval
from the Federal Trade Commission or exigent circumstances. H.R. 3849, 117th Cong.
§§ 4(e)(1)–(2). The Act further mandates that “[a] covered platform shall provide reasonable advance notice to a competing business or a potential competing business . . . of any
change to an interoperability interface maintained by the covered platform that will affect
the interoperability of a competing business or a potential competing business.” Id.
§ 4(e)(4).
218. MANNE & BOWMAN, supra note 205, at 20.
219. See Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 1956 ( “[B]road regulation is ill-suited for digital
platforms because they are so disparate.”).
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(DMU) within the nation’s antitrust agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).220
According to the CMA’s proposal to create the DMU, the unit has
authority to ensure that the digital firms it deems to possess “strategic
market status” act to achieve three objectives: fair trading, open choices,
and trust and transparency.221 To secure compliance with those objectives, which are essentially standards, the DMU is authorized to craft tailor-made codes of conduct for each of the platforms determined to
possess strategic market status.222 This approach is analogous to an antitrust court’s crafting of firm-specific conduct remedies to ensure compliance with antitrust law’s standards (e.g., no unreasonable restraints of
trade, no unreasonably exclusionary conduct).223 The approach is quite
different from the European Union’s approach of positing generally applicable rules for all major platforms. As Cristina Caffarra and Fiona
Scott Morton have explained, under the U.K. approach:
[T]here is no fixed, pre-established list of rules. The DMU will evaluate whether a particular platform has this important level of market
power and at the same time develop the set of rules needed to protect consumers and prevent exclusion of rivals or exploitation of
trading partners. As the CMA puts it, the goal is “(a)n enforceable
code of conduct which sets out clearly how the firm is expected to
behave in relation to the activity motivating its Strategic Market Status designation.”224
Caffarra and Scott Morton contend that this tailored approach “seems
very apt” as “it will generate rules targeted to the problematic conduct,
that directly take into account the business model and that can be adjusted and updated as technology and business models evolve one by
one.”225
The agency oversight approach, however, is not simply faster antitrust
law with expert adjudicators. While standards-based and flexible, the approach differs from antitrust along three significant dimensions: focus,
political susceptibility, and duration of control. Taken together, antitrust
courts’ more narrowly focused objectives, greater insulation from political influences, and limited jurisdiction over their subjects render them far
less susceptible to adverse public-choice concerns than are agencies like
the United Kingdom’s DMU.
220. See Olson, supra note 76. The existing DMU has not yet been legislatively approved and is therefore operating with limited powers at present. Id.
221. OLIVER DOWDEN & KWASI KWARTENG, A NEW PRO-COMPETITION REGIME FOR
DIGITAL MARKETS ¶ 83 (2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/
5fce7567e90e07562f98286c/Digital_Taskforce_-_Advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLX4FHMC].
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
224. Cristina Caffarra & Fiona Scott Morton, The European Commission Digital Markets Act: A Translation, VOXEU (Jan. 5, 2021) (emphasis omitted), https://voxeu.org/article/european-commission-digital-markets-act-translation [https://perma.cc/C5L7-HMQR].
225. Id.
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In crafting remedies for anticompetitive harm, antitrust courts have a
tremendous reservoir of authority.226 But antitrust’s focus—and the objective of any court-ordered remedy—is narrow: the restoration of market output to competitive levels for the benefit of consumers.227 This
precludes successful claims by and remedies in favor of parties seeking
some private benefit apart from the enhancement of market output. A
digital-markets regulator is unlikely to be as laser-focused on output effects as an antitrust court and will, therefore, be a more attractive target
to rent-seeking firms. The DMU’s “open choices” objective, for example,
invites a laggard competitor, which might otherwise be driven out of business, to seek some rule that hinders its more efficient rivals on the ground
that preserving its own offering will create a broader range of options for
consumers.
A second important difference between antitrust courts and agencies
relates to the decisionmakers’ incentives. The federal judges determining
liability and imposing remedies in antitrust cases have little reason to
please the parties before them. Possessing life tenure and fearing no retribution save possible reversal, they are insulated from outside pressure
and motivated to make decisions calculated to enhance market output
and thereby benefit consumers. Agency staff, by contrast, do not enjoy
this level of political insulation. Many bureaucrats will have been appointed by or have ties to a political leader whom they will wish to please.
They may also contemplate future employment at one of their regulatees
or at a regulatee’s rival. Even absent contemplation of a job change, they
may have a stake in one regulatory outcome over another as the budget
or prestige of their agency may be affected by the regulatory choices they
make. Their personal interests are, therefore, less aligned with the public’s interest in maximizing overall market output.
A third difference between antitrust and agency oversight is that antitrust courts’ involvement with parties is limited in duration while agencies
remain perpetually involved with the firms they regulate. Ongoing oversight requires continuous contact with the regulatee whose perspective
the regulator needs in order to make sound decisions. Eventually, however, the regulator may begin seeing things from the perspective of the
regulatee.228 This is especially likely if the individuals with interests adverse to the regulatee’s position are widely dispersed and difficult to or226. Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 2005 (“Antitrust’s provisions for public equitable
relief are extremely broad, with no explicit restrictions on the nature of relief.”).
227. By “consumers” we mean parties on the other side of the transaction from an
antitrust defendant, which, in cases involving exercises of monopsony power, could include
laborers and suppliers forced to accept lower wages or input prices. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
583, 628–36 (2018) (explaining how consumer welfare standard addresses buyer market
power and labor market monopsony).
228. This is sometimes referred to as “cultural capture,” a form of “non-materialist”
capture that does not turn on the provision of material benefits from regulatee to regulator. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71, 79 (Daniel Carpenter & David
Moss eds., 2014).
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ganize.229 The benefits to a regulatee from a decision may be outweighed
by the aggregate costs the decision would impose, but if the costs are so
widely spread that no individual or group has an incentive to incur the
cost of arguing against the decision, the only argument the regulator will
hear is that of the regulatee–beneficiary.230 In light of the relationships
that develop from perpetual supervision and the common “concentrated
benefits-diffused costs” dynamic, agencies possessing continuous oversight over their regulatees are frequently captured by those firms to the
detriment of the public at large.231
It seems, then, that the ongoing agency oversight model for addressing
market power from digital platforms may not be the panacea its proponents have suggested. Combining broad discretion that invites interestgroup manipulation, exposure to political pressures that may sway regulators from pursuing the public interest, and the sort of continuous regulatee contact that often leads to capture, the approach raises serious
public-choice concerns. The United Kingdom’s experience with its new
DMU will be informative. But U.S. policymakers would do well to wait
on the results of the United Kingdom’s experiment, and the resolution of
the numerous pending antitrust actions, before abandoning antitrust in
favor of a digital platforms regulator.
V. CONCLUSION
Under certain circumstances, markets may systematically fail to allocate resources in a way that generates as much value as possible for members of society. The same is true for government interventions to correct
instances of market failure.
In light of that unhappy situation, policymakers confronting a market
failure should catalogue the remedies available for addressing it (including the option of doing nothing), consider the efficacy limitations and side
effects of each, and select the option most likely to minimize the sum of
welfare losses from market and governmental failure. As policymakers
engage in that analysis, they should keep in mind two difficulties that
attach, in varying degrees, to all efforts to use state power to alleviate
market failures: the Hayekian knowledge problem and public-choice
concerns.
This Article has engaged in the preceding analysis to answer the question of how governments should address market power concerns arising
from dominant digital platforms. The three approaches typically employed to remedy market power—antitrust law, ex ante conduct rules,
and ongoing agency supervision—are all imperfect. Antitrust law is some229. See Lambert, supra note 97, at 504–05 (describing dynamic of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs).
230. See MATTHEW D. MITCHELL & PETER J. BOETTKE, APPLIED MAINLINE ECONOMICS 75–76 (2017); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 9–16 (1965).
231. See LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 168–69.
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what indeterminate and proceeds rather slowly. Ex ante conduct rules are
faster and more determinate, but they are more likely to generate high
error costs because planners lack the information they need to determine,
in advance and for a wide variety of actors, what behaviors will enhance
or reduce social welfare. At first glance, ongoing agency oversight appears to combine the good and avoid the bad from the first two options: it
may move faster than antitrust and offer greater clarity to regulatees, and
its ability to tailor directives on a case-by-case basis avoids many of the
knowledge problem concerns afflicting ex ante conduct rules. Continual
agency oversight, however, involves a combination of features—broad
discretion, politically susceptible decisionmakers, and perpetual contact—that generates significant public-choice concerns.
Policymakers in the United States are currently facing pressure from
both the left and the right to do something about the digital platforms
that, because of the enormous surplus they offer consumers, have become
so central to twenty-first century life. The objective of this Article has not
been to argue that the status quo is perfect or that competitive conditions
could not be improved. Consideration of the possible downsides of a
move to ex ante conduct rules or continual agency oversight, however,
urges caution. At a minimum, U.S. policymakers should await the outcome of the major pending antitrust cases against the technology platforms and gather data from the natural experiments occurring in the
European Union and United Kingdom before jettisoning antitrust in
favor of ex ante conduct rules or some new digital platforms regulator.
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